



# Supply Chain Supernetworks with Random Demands

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
**Isenberg School of Management**


**University of Massachusetts at Amherst**

***In Honor of Professor David Boyce***


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Association International, Philadelphia Nov. 20, 2003***

## Business Initiative Trends in Manufacturing






# The Dynamics of the Supply Chain




Source: Tom Mc Guffry, *Electronic Commerce and Value Chain Management*, 1998

# What Management Gets...



Source: Tom Mc Guffry, *Electronic Commerce and Value Chain Management*, 1998

# What Management Wants...



Source: Tom Mc Guffry, *Electronic Commerce and Value Chain Management*, 1998

**The overall Supply Chain Planning & Collaboration (SCP&C) market exceeded \$1,903 million in 2003 despite the weak macroeconomic environment over the past two years.**

**This is particularly interesting since the recession in the United States had substantial reductions in capital spending, especially spending on information technology.**

**The industrial manufacturing sector, at \$1,615 million, accounted for 85 percent of this market.**

*DEDHAM, Mass.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Nov. 18, 2003*

# The Supernetwork Supply Chain Model with Random Demands

## **Captures**

- **competition and coordination**

## **Determines**

- **production quantities**
- **shipments**
- **prices**
- **expected demands**

## **Includes**

- **physical transactions**
- **electronic transactions**



# Supernetwork Structure




Figure 1: The Supernetwork Structure of the Supply Chain

# Behavior of the Manufacturers

Profit maximization problem for manufacturer  $i$

$$\text{Maximize } \sum_{j=1}^n \rho_{1ij}^* q_{ij} + \sum_{k=1}^o \rho_{1ik}^* q_{ik} - f_i(Q^1, Q^2) - \sum_{j=1}^n c_{ij}(q_{ij}) - \sum_{k=1}^o c_{ik}(q_{ik}),$$

subject to  $q_{ij} \geq 0$ , for all  $j$ , and  $q_{ik} \geq 0$ , for all  $k$ .

$q_i$  : production output

$q_{ij}$  : shipment from  $i$  to  $j$

$q_{ik}$  : shipment from  $i$  to  $j$  via e-link

$\rho_{1ij}^*$  : price charged by manufacturer  $i$  to distributor  $j$

$\rho_{1ik}^*$  : price charged by manufacturer  $i$  to retailer  $k$

# The Optimality Condition for Manufacturers

$$\sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \left[ \frac{\partial f_i(Q^1, Q^2)}{\partial q_{ij}} + \frac{\partial c_{ij}(q_{ij}^*)}{\partial q_{ij}} - \rho_{1ij}^* \right] \times [q_{ij} - q_{ij}^*] \\ + \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ \frac{\partial f_i(Q^1, Q^2)}{\partial q_{ik}} + \frac{\partial c_{ik}(q_{ik}^*)}{\partial q_{ik}} - \rho_{1ik}^* \right] \times [q_{ik} - q_{ik}^*] \geq 0, \quad \forall (Q^1, Q^2) \in R_+^{mn+mo}. \quad (5)$$

# Behavior of the Distributors

Profit maximization problem for distributor  $j$

$$\text{Maximize } \gamma_j^* \sum_{k=1}^o q_{jk} - c_j(Q^1, Q^3) - \sum_{i=1}^m \rho_{1ij}^* q_{ij}$$

subject to:

$$\sum_{k=1}^o q_{jk} \leq \sum_{i=1}^m q_{ij},$$

$q_{ij}$ : shipment from  $i$  to  $j$

$q_{jk}$ : shipment from  $j$  to  $k$

$\gamma_j^*$ : price charged by distributor  $j$

# Optimality Conditions for the Distributors

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \left[ \frac{\partial c_j(Q^{1*}, Q^{3*})}{\partial q_{ij}} + \rho_{1ij}^* - \rho_{2j}^* \right] \times [q_{ij} - q_{ij}^*] \\
 + & \sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ -\gamma_j^* + \frac{\partial c_j(Q^{1*}, Q^{3*})}{\partial q_{jk}} + \rho_{2j}^* \right] \times [q_{jk} - q_{jk}^*] + \sum_{j=1}^n \left[ \sum_{i=1}^m q_{ij}^* - \sum_{k=1}^o q_{jk}^* \right] \times [\rho_{2j} - \rho_{2j}^*] \geq 0 \\
 & \forall Q^1 \in R_+^{mn}, \forall Q^3 \in R_+^{no}, \forall \rho_2 \in R_+^n, \tag{9}
 \end{aligned}$$

# The Retailers

$$s_k = \sum_{i=1}^m q_{ik} + \sum_{j=1}^n q_{jk}$$

$\rho_{3k}$  : demand price at retailer  $k$

$\hat{d}_k(\rho_{3k})$  : random demand at retailer  $k$

$\square_k(x, \rho_{3k})$  : density function

$P_k(x, \rho_{3k})$  : probability function of  $\hat{d}_k(\rho_{3k})$

$$P_k(x, \rho_{3k}) = P_k(\hat{d}_k \leq x) = \int_0^x \square_k(x, \rho_{3k}) dx$$

$\min\{s_k, \hat{d}_k\}$  : the actual sale of  $k$  cannot exceed this amount

$$\Delta_k^+ \equiv \max\{0, s_k - \hat{d}_k\} \quad (11)$$

and

$$\Delta_k^- \equiv \max\{0, \hat{d}_k - s_k\}, \quad (12)$$

where  $\Delta_k^+$  is a random variable representing the excess supply (inventory), whereas  $\Delta_k^-$  is a random variable representing the excess demand (shortage).

Note that the expected values of excess supply and excess demand of retailer  $k$  are scalar functions of  $s_k$  and  $\rho_{3k}$ . In particular, let  $e_k^+$  and  $e_k^-$  denote, respectively, the expected values:  $E(\Delta_k^+)$  and  $E(\Delta_k^-)$ , that is,

$$e_k^+(s_k, \rho_{3k}) \equiv E(\Delta_k^+) = \int_0^{s_k} (s_k - x) \mathcal{F}_k(x, \rho_{3k}) dx, \quad (13)$$

$$e_k^-(s_k, \rho_{3k}) \equiv E(\Delta_k^-) = \int_{s_k}^{\infty} (x - s_k) \mathcal{F}_k(x, \rho_{3k}) dx. \quad (14)$$

$\lambda_k^+$  : unit penalty of having excess supply at retailer  $k$

$\lambda_k^-$  : unit penalty of having excess demand at retailer  $k$

**The expected total penalty of retailer  $k$  is given by**

$$E(\lambda_k^+ \Delta_k^+ + \lambda_k^- \Delta_k^-) = \lambda_k^+ e_k^+(s_k, \rho_{3k}) + \lambda_k^- e_k^-(s_k, \rho_{3k}).$$



# Behavior of the Retailers

Profit maximization problem for retailer  $k$

$$\text{Maximize } E(\rho_{3k} \min\{s_k, \hat{d}_k\}) - E(\lambda_k^+ \Delta_k^+ + \lambda_k^- \Delta_k^-) - c_k(Q^2, Q^3) - \sum_{i=1}^m \rho_{1ik}^* q_{ik} - \sum_{j=1}^n \gamma_j^* q_{jk}$$

subject to:

$$q_{ik} \geq 0, \quad q_{jk} \geq 0, \text{ for all } i \text{ and } j.$$

Applying the definitions of  $\Delta_k^+$ ,  $\Delta_k^-$ ,

$$\text{Maximize } \rho_{3k} d_k(\rho_{3k}) - (\rho_{3k} + \lambda_k^-) e_k^-(s_k, \rho_{3k}) - \lambda_k^+ e_k^+(s_k, \rho_{3k}) - c_k(Q^2, Q^3) - \sum_{i=1}^m \rho_{1ik}^* q_{ik} - \sum_{j=1}^n \gamma_j^* q_{jk}$$

where  $d_j(\rho_{3k}) \equiv E(\hat{d}_k)$  is a scalar function of  $\rho_{3k}$ .

# Optimality Conditions for the Retailers

Assuming that the handling cost for each retailer is continuous and convex, then the optimality conditions for all the retailers satisfy the variational inequality: determine  $(Q^{2*}, Q^{3*}) \in R_+^{mo+no}$ , satisfying:

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ \lambda_k^+ P_k(s_k^*, \rho_{3k}) - (\lambda_k^- + \rho_{3k})(1 - P_k(s_k^*, \rho_{3k})) + \frac{\partial c_k(Q^{2*}, Q^{3*})}{\partial q_{ik}} + \rho_{1ik}^* \right] \times [q_{ik} - q_{ik}^*] \\ & + \sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ \lambda_k^+ P_k(s_k^*, \rho_{3k}) - (\lambda_k^- + \rho_{3k})(1 - P_k(s_k^*, \rho_{3k})) + \frac{\partial c_k(Q^{2*}, Q^{3*})}{\partial q_{jk}} + \gamma_j^* \right] \times [q_{jk} - q_{jk}^*] \geq 0, \\ & \forall (Q^2, Q^3) \in R_+^{mo+no}. \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

# The Stochastic Market Equilibrium Conditions

For any retailer  $k$

$$\hat{d}_k(\rho_{3k}^*) \begin{cases} \leq \sum_{i=1}^m q_{ik}^* + \sum_{j=1}^o q_{jk}^* & \text{a.e., if } \rho_{3k}^* = 0 \\ = \sum_{i=1}^m q_{ik}^* + \sum_{j=1}^o q_{jk}^* & \text{a.e., if } \rho_{3k}^* > 0, \end{cases}$$

where a.e. means that the corresponding equality or inequality holds almost everywhere.

$$\sum_{k=1}^o \left( \sum_{i=1}^m q_{ik}^* + \sum_{j=1}^n q_{jk}^* - d_j(\rho_{3k}^*) \right) \times [\rho_{3k} - \rho_{3k}^*] \geq 0, \quad \forall \rho_3 \in R_+, \quad (22)$$

where  $\rho_3$  is the  $o$ -dimensional column vector with components:  $\{\rho_{31}, \dots, \rho_{3o}\}$ .

# Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Random Demands

## **Definition:**

**The equilibrium state of the supply chain with random demands is one where the product flows between the tiers of the decision-makers coincide and the product shipments and prices satisfy the sum of the optimality conditions (5), (9), and (20), and the conditions (20).**

# Variational Inequality Formulation

## Theorem 1: Variational Inequality Formulation

A product shipment and price pattern  $(Q^1, Q^2, Q^3, \rho_2, \rho_3) \in \mathcal{K}$  is an equilibrium pattern of the supply chain model according to Definition 1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \left[ \frac{\partial f_i(Q^1, Q^2)}{\partial q_{ij}} + \frac{\partial c_{ij}(q_{ij}^*)}{\partial q_{ij}} + \frac{\partial c_j(Q^1, Q^3)}{\partial q_{ij}} - \rho_{2j}^* \right] \times [q_{ij} - q_{ij}^*] \\
 & \quad + \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ \frac{\partial f_i(Q^1, Q^2)}{\partial q_{ik}} + \frac{\partial c_{ik}(q_{ik}^*)}{\partial q_{ik}} + \frac{\partial c_k(Q^2, Q^3)}{\partial q_{ik}} \right. \\
 & \quad \left. + \lambda_k^+ P_k(s_k^*, \rho_{3k}^*) - (\lambda_k^- + \rho_{3k}^*)(1 - P_k(s_k^*, \rho_{3k}^*)) \right] \times [q_{ik} - q_{ik}^*] \\
 & \quad + \sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ \lambda_k^+ P_k(s_k^*, \rho_{3k}^*) - (\lambda_k^- + \rho_{3k}^*)(1 - P_k(s_k^*, \rho_{3k}^*)) + \frac{\partial c_j(Q^1, Q^3)}{\partial q_{jk}} \right. \\
 & \quad \left. + \frac{\partial c_k(Q^2, Q^3)}{\partial q_{jk}} + \rho_{2j}^* \right] \times [q_{jk} - q_{jk}^*] + \sum_{j=1}^n \left[ \sum_{i=1}^m q_{ij}^* - \sum_{k=1}^o q_{jk}^* \right] \times [\rho_{2j} - \rho_{2j}^*] \\
 & \quad + \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ \sum_{j=1}^n q_{jk}^* + \sum_{i=1}^m q_{ik}^* - d_k(\rho_3^*) \right] \times [\rho_{3k} - \rho_{3k}^*] \geq 0, \quad \forall (Q^1, Q^2, Q^3, \rho_2, \rho_3) \in \mathcal{K}, \quad (23)
 \end{aligned}$$

# Qualitative Properties

**Under certain conditions we proved the existence of the solution and the uniqueness of the solution to the VIP.**

# Numerical Examples


In all the examples, we assumed that the demands associated with the retail outlets followed a uniform distribution. Hence, we assumed that the random demand,  $\hat{d}_k(\rho_{3k})$ , of retailer  $k$ , is uniformly distributed in  $[0, \frac{b_k}{\rho_{3k}}]$ ,  $b_k > 0$ ;  $k = 1, \dots, o$ . Therefore,

$$P_k(x, \rho_{3k}) = \frac{x \rho_{3k}}{b_k}, \quad (51)$$

$$\mathcal{F}_j(x, \rho_{3k}) = \frac{\rho_{3k}}{b_k}, \quad (52)$$

$$d_k(\rho_{3k}) = E(\hat{d}_k) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{b_k}{\rho_{3k}}; \quad k = 1, \dots, o. \quad (53)$$

It is easy to verify that the expected demand function  $d_k(\rho_{3k})$  associated with retailer  $k$  is a decreasing function of the price at the demand market.



$$f_1(q) = 2.5q_1^2 + q_1q_2 + 2q_1, \quad f_2(q) = 2.5q_2^2 + q_1q_2 + 2q_2.$$

$$c_{ij}(q_{ij}) = .5q_{ij}^2 + 3.5q_{ij}, \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2.$$

$$c_{ik}(q_{ik}) = .5q_{ik}^2 + 5q_{ik}, \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2; k = 1, 2.$$

$$c_j(Q^1, Q^3) = .5\left(\sum_{i=1}^2 q_{ij}\right)^2, \quad \text{for } j = 1, 2,$$

$$c_k(Q^2, Q^3) = .5\left(\sum_{j=1}^2 q_{jk}\right)^2, \quad \text{for } k = 1, 2.$$



## Example 1

$$\lambda_k^+ = \lambda_k^- = 1, k = 1, 2$$

$$b_k = 100, k = 1, 2.$$

$$q_{ij}^* = .3697, i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2.$$

$$q_{ik}^* = .3487, i = 1, 2; k = 1, 2.$$

$$q_{jk}^* = .3697, j = 1, 2; k = 1, 2.$$

$$\rho_{2j}^* = 15.2301, j = 1, 2.$$

$$\rho_{3k}^* = 34.5573, k = 1, 2.$$

$$d_1(\rho_{31}^*) = d_2(\rho_{32}^*) = 1.4469.$$

## Example 2

$$\lambda_k^+ = \lambda_k^- = 1, k = 1, 2$$

$$b_k = 1000, k = 1, 2.$$

$$q_{ij}^* = .6974, i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2.$$

$$q_{ik}^* = 1.9870, i = 1, 2; k = 1, 2.$$

$$q_{jk}^* = .6973, j = 1, 2; k = 1, 2.$$

$$\rho_{2j}^* = 39.8051, j = 1, 2.$$

$$\rho_{3k}^* = 92.9553, k = 1, 2.$$

$$d_1(\rho_{31}^*) = d_2(\rho_{32}^*) = 5.3789.$$

# Thank you!



**More information about  
Supernetworks can be found at**

**<http://supernet.som.umass.edu>**