

# Trade Wars and Game Theory: Who Wins, Who Loses?

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**Special acknowledgments and thanks to my collaborators and students who have made research and teaching always stimulating and rewarding.**

# Outline of This Presentation

- **Background and Motivation**
- **International Trade and Policies**
- **Some of Our Research on Tariffs and Trade Policies**
- **International Agricultural Trade and Policies**
- **Supply Chain Network Model with Labor and Tariffs**
- **Rerouting to Avoid Tariffs**
- **Some Related Recent Research**
- **Making a Positive Impact**

# Background and Motivation

# I Work on the Modeling of Network Systems







# Some of My Books



# My Latest Books



# International Trade and Policies

# International Trade

International trade provides us with commodities throughout the year and has benefits for producers and consumers alike.



# World Trade Data - Top Exporters and Importers



# Global Trade Policies

Examples of policy instruments that have been applied by governments to modify trade patterns include: **tariffs (unit and ad valorem ones)**, **quotas**, and a combination thereof - **tariff rate quotas**.



# Tariff Rate Quotas

- A tariff rate quota (TRQ) is a **two-tiered tariff**, in which a lower **in-quota tariff** is applied to imports until a quota is attained and then a higher **over-quota tariff** is applied to all subsequent imports.
- The Uruguay Round in 1996 induced the creation of more than 1,300 new TRQs.
- The world's four most important food crops: rice, wheat, corn, and bananas have all been subject to tariff rate quotas.



# Some History of the US and Tariffs

**The Tariff of 1789**, signed by President George Washington, was one of the first laws passed by the new federal government, was as much about protection as it was about raising money. The tariff imposed duties on a wide range of imported goods and helped to pay down the young nation's war debts. There were both unit tariffs imposed as well as ad valorem tariffs.

- **An ad valorem tariff** of 5% to 15% was imposed on most imported goods.
- **A unit tariff** was imposed on over 30 commodities including: coffee, tea, distilled spirits, cheese, cocoa, and molasses.

# Some History of the US and Tariffs

**Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930**, signed by President Hebert Hoover, raised tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to protect farmers and industries during the Great Depression.

- **Most were unit tariffs**, rather than ad valorem ones.

**However, it triggered retaliatory tariffs from trading partners, slashing global trade by 66% and deepening the economic crisis.**

# Tariffs Are Regularly in the News!

The imposition of tariffs by certain countries is leading to retaliation by other countries with ramifications across multiple supply chains, and a **trade war**.

## *With Higher Tariffs, China Retaliates Against the U.S.*



The Yangshan Deep Water Port in Shanghai, China. The Chinese government said on Monday that it would raise tariffs on goods from the United States as of June 1, giving negotiators from the two countries time to strike a deal. *Aly Song/Reuters*

## **Trump's Tariffs Would Deal a Big Blow to the Auto Industry**

Automakers and parts suppliers would struggle if President-elect Donald J. Trump followed through on his threat to impose 25 percent tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico.



Nissan and other automakers are cutting thousands of jobs as they struggle to cope with sagging demand and a growing preference for hybrid and electric cars. *Uesato/Reuters*

President-elect Donald J. Trump's threat to impose 25 percent tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada sent shivers on Tuesday through the auto industry, which depends heavily on both countries for parts and manufacturing.

# Tariffs Are Regularly in the News!

CANADA | AMERICA | EXPORT IMPORT

## Trump's Proposed 25% Tariff on Canada and Mexico: Potential Impacts on Agriculture and Trade

By Jim Kelle - January 23, 2025



NEWS

### Shipping companies warn of delays and new charges from Trump's China tariffs



Temu, Shein, and Amazon Haul are about to get wrecked

/ Delays, taxes, & more  
— shipping from just got more co

### What might be the impact on agriculture of tariffs on Canadian and Mexican imports?

# // BLOG // WHAT MIGHT BE THE IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE OF TARIFFS ON CANADIAN AND MEXICAN IMPORTS?

## Tariffs on Canadian and Mexican Imports: The Impact on Agriculture

It should come as no surprise that Mexico and Canada are the top-two US agricultural export markets

PUBLISHED ON JANUARY 29, 2025

### America's favorite beer, avocados, gas and cheap stuff from Temu will get more expensive as economists warn of Trump tariffs impact

By Rocky Reyes  
Published Feb. 2, 2025, 6:29 p.m. ET

1.9K Comments

### New Tariffs That Start Tomorrow Could Affect Farmers and Food Prices

The Trump administration will impose a 25 percent tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico, the U.S.' first and third largest suppliers of agricultural products.

BY USA HELD • JANUARY 31, 2025

### Trump's tariffs will hurt UK wherever they're imposed, says Bank

A global trade war would hit growth even if Britain is not a 'direct recipient' of the US president's levies on imports, the Bank of England governor says

NEW

LOCAL NEWS

### Colorado agriculture producers brace for tariff impacts



By Chris Young  
February 3, 2025, 7:52 AM MST | 286 Colorado



**President Donald Trump, on April 2, 2025, proclaimed “Liberation Day” in the White House Rose Garden, announcing a unilateral 10% tariff on almost all foreign imports, rising up to 50% for many countries. He invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).**

- The effective tariff rate in the US briefly topped 20%. Even after falling to 10.5% **it is at its highest since the 1940s.**

- **Between May and December 2025, real imports from China were over 40% lower than the same months in 2024.**


The use of “real” implies that the figures are adjusted for price changes (inflation), showing a true, sharp reduction in physical volume of goods, not just a fluctuation in prices.

# Supreme Court Decision on Tariffs on February 20, 2026

Chief Justice Roberts' paragraph from the majority opinion on President Trump lacking the authority he had claimed, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to impose tariffs on countries all over the world: *Since imposing each set of tariffs, the president has issued several increases, reductions and other modifications. One month after imposing the 10 percent drug trafficking tariffs on Chinese goods, he increased the rate to 20 percent. One month later, he removed a statutory exemption for Chinese goods under \$800. Less than a week after imposing the reciprocal tariffs, the president increased the rate on Chinese goods from 34 percent to 84 percent. The very next day, he increased the rate further still, to 125 percent. This brought the total effective tariff rate on most Chinese goods to 145 percent. The president has also shifted sets of goods into and out of the reciprocal tariff framework ([e.g.,] exempting from reciprocal tariffs beef, fruits, coffee, tea, spices and some fertilizers). And he has issued a variety of other adjustments ([e.g.,] extending "the suspension of heightened reciprocal tariffs" on Chinese imports.*



# Invalidated Tariffs



According to *The New York Times*, the Supreme Court ruling marks an end to the tariffs President Trump announced last April on “Liberation Day.” These tariffs were among his most punishing.

# Revenue Collected by US from Invalidated Tariffs

The U.S. government collected over \$130 billion to \$166 billion in revenue from the invalidated Trump-era tariffs.



Estimates suggest that up to \$175 billion in revenue, including interest, is now subject to potential refunds to businesses.

# After Certain Tariffs Were Invalidated

- **President Trump invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a 10% (potentially rising to 15%) global tariff on most imports, effective February 24, 2026. This temporary 150-day measure aims at countries with significant trade surpluses, while exempting certain goods not produced in the U.S. On Friday, April 10, 2026, the U.S. Court of International Trade, a specialized court in New York, heard oral arguments in an attempt to overturn these temporary tariffs.**
- **The administration continues to rely on Section 232 (national security) and Section 301 (unfair trade practices) to maintain or increase tariffs on specific goods, including 50% on steel/aluminum/copper and 25% on autos.**

We have been developing **computable operational mathematical models** that enable the assessment of the impacts of trade policy instruments on consumer prices, trade flows, as well as on the profits of producers/firms.

This is very challenging research!

# Some of Our Research on Tariffs and Trade Policies



# An Example of Our Trade Policy Research

**A. Nagurney, D. Besik, and L.S. Nagurney, “Global Supply Chain Networks and Tariff Rate Quotas: Equilibrium Analysis with Application to Agricultural Products, *Journal of Global Optimization* 75 (2019), pp 439-460.**



**The model is a game theory one with tariff rate quotas and the numerical case study is on avocados.**

# Another Example of Our Trade Policy Research

**A. Nagurney, D. Besik, and J. Dong, “Tariffs and Quotas in World Trade: A Unified Variational Inequality Framework,”**  
*European Journal of Operational Research* 275(1) (2019), pp  
347-360.



**The model is a spatial price equilibrium one with tariff rate quotas and the numerical case study is on the dairy industry.**

# Investigation of Tariffs and Quotas in the Pandemic

**A. Nagurney, M. Salarpour, and J. Dong, “Modeling of Covid-19 Trade Measures on Essential Products: A Multiproduct, Multicountry Spatial Price Equilibrium Framework,” *International Transactions in Operational Research* 29(1) (2022), pp 226-258.**



**The model is a spatial price equilibrium one with unit tariffs, quotas, price floors, and ceilings. The case study is on N95 masks.**

# International Agricultural Trade and Policies

# Acknowledgment



**I acknowledge the partnership between the University of Massachusetts Amherst and the Kyiv School of Economics, which facilitated our research on international agricultural trade.**



## Quantification of International Trade Network Performance Under Disruptions to Supply, Transportation, and Demand Capacity, and Exchange Rates in Disasters



Anna Nagurney, Dana Hanouf, Qing Wengwang, and Paris Molyneux

**Abstract** Both sudden-onset and slow-onset disasters are causing disruptions to global trade, impacting the availability and affordability of commodities from agricultural to consumer uses. In this chapter, we develop a multicommodity international trade network equilibrium model under disaster scenarios with disaster probabilities, the occurrence of the disasters and first impacts on the capacities associated with production, transportation, and consumption. The disaster scenarios can also affect the exchange rates. We state the governing equilibrium conditions and derive the variational inequality formulation to commodity path flow variables and Lagrange multipliers associated with the capacity constraints. For each disaster scenario, we construct an international trade network performance measure, followed by a variational performance measure that includes all the disasters and their probabilities. Extensions to this formulation as the difference between the network performance under no disruptions and the variational performance. An international trade network component performance indicator is also given to assess the impact of the complete removal of trade network supply markets, demand markets, and/or transportation routes. The modeling framework is first illustrated through a series of numerical examples, motivated by Russia's war on Ukraine. The work is of relevance to decision analysis and policy studies.


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A. Nagurney et al. (eds.), *Disasters of Disasters: Supply Vulnerability and Its Implications* (2), <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-211-14414-7>

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TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE

## A Multisector, Multicommodity, Capacitated International Agricultural Trade Network Equilibrium Model with Applications to Ukraine in Wartime

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# International Agricultural Trade

**International agricultural trade provides us with essential agri-food commodities throughout the year, ensuring our food security and simultaneously benefiting the farmers.**



# Farmers are Dealing with Disasters on Top of Tariffs

- **Climate change and COVID-19 impacted the affordability and accessibility of agri-food products around the globe.**
- **With the added disruptions of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, around 47 million people are estimated to have been added to the more than 276 million who were already facing food insecurity.**
- **Critical links such as the Panama Canal and the Red Sea and Suez Canal have been disrupted because of a drought affecting the former and Houthi attacks the latter and now we have the war on Iran with the Strait of Hormuz disrupted.**



# Supply Chain Network Model with Labor and Tariffs

# Impacts of Tariffs in Supply Chains on Labor

**A. Nagurney and S. Samadi, “Ad Valorem Tariffs in Global Supply Chain Networks and Impacts on Labor,”** *Journal of the Operational Research Society* (2025),  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01605682.2025.2592758>.



**The model is a game theory one and the numerical case study is on soybeans.**



**Table:** Notation for the Global Supply Chain Network Model with Tariffs

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Definition</b>
$s_j^i$	nonnegative production output (supply) of firm $i$ at its production site $j$ ; $j = 1, \dots, n_i$ . Group outputs for each $i$ ; $i = 1, \dots, l$ , into vector $s^i \in R_+^{n_i}$ and all such vectors into $s \in R_+^{\sum_{i=1}^l n_i}$ .
$Q_{jk}^i$	nonnegative amount of firm $i$ 's product produced at its site $j$ and shipped to demand market $k$ . The $\{Q_{jk}^i\}$ elements for all $j$ and $k$ are grouped into vector $Q^i \in R_+^{n_i^o}$ and $Q^i$ ; $i = 1, \dots, l$ , into $Q \in R_+^{\sum_{i=1}^l n_i^o}$ .
$d_k^i$	demand for firm $i$ 's product at demand market $k$ . Group demands for firm $i$ 's product for each $i = 1, \dots, l$ , into vector $d^i \in R_+^o$ and then group demands for all $i$ into $d \in R_+^{lo}$ .
$l_j^i$	labor (in hours) available at firm $i$ 's production site $j$ ; $i = 1, \dots, l$ ; $j = 1, \dots, n_i$ .
$l_{jk}^i$	labor (in hours) available for shipping firm $i$ 's product for $i = 1, \dots, l$ from its production site $j$ ; $j = 1, \dots, n_i$ to market $k$ ; $k = 1, \dots, o$ .

**Table:** Notation for the Global Supply Chain Network Model with Tariffs

<b>Functions</b>	<b>Definition</b>
$f_j^i(s)$	production cost at firm $i$ 's site $j$ .
$\hat{c}_{jk}^i(Q)$	total transportation cost associated with shipping firm $i$ 's product, produced at site $j$ , to demand market $k$ .
$\rho_k^i(d)$	demand price function for firm $i$ 's product at demand market $k$ .

**Table:** Notation for the Global Supply Chain Network Model with Tariffs

Parameters	Definition
$w_j^i$	hourly wage at firm $i$ 's production site $j$ .
$w_{jk}^i$	hourly wage for shipping firm $i$ 's product from its production site $j$ to demand market $k$ .
$\beta_j^i$	positive factor relating inputs of labor at firm $i$ 's production site $j$ to the amount of product produced there.
$\beta_{jk}^i$	positive factor relating inputs of labor to shipment volume of firm $i$ 's product from its site $j$ to market $k$ .
$\bar{l}_j^i$	upper bound on labor hours of availability at production site $j$ of firm $i$ .
$\bar{l}_{jk}^i$	upper bound on labor hours of availability for shipment of firm $i$ 's product produced at its site $j$ to market $k$ .
$\tau_{jk}^i$	ad valorem tariff rate between country that production site $j$ of firm $i$ is in and country of market $k$

# Conservation of Flow Equations

The production output at firm  $i$ 's site  $j$ ,  $s_j^i$ , is equal to the total shipments of firm  $i$ 's product to all the demand markets; that is:

$$s_j^i = \sum_{k=1}^o Q_{jk}^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, l; j = 1, \dots, n_i, \quad (1)$$

whereas the demand for firm  $i$ 's product at demand market  $k$ ,  $d_k^i$ , must be satisfied by the firm's product shipments from all the firm's production sites to each demand market; hence:

$$d_k^i = \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} Q_{jk}^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, l; k = 1, \dots, o. \quad (2)$$

Furthermore, all the product shipments must be nonnegative:

$$Q_{jk}^i \geq 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, l; j = 1, \dots, n_i; k = 1, \dots, o. \quad (3)$$

# Relationship Between Labor and Productivity

Using an approach as in Nagurney (2023a, b), relating labor to production outputs, as in economics, we have that the relationships, under the assumption of linearity between product outputs and labor, are at the production sites, and in transportation, respectively, as follows:

$$s_j^i = \beta_j^i l_j^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, l; j = 1, \dots, n_i, \quad (4)$$

and

$$Q_{jk}^i = \beta_{jk}^i l_{jk}^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, l; j = 1, \dots, n_i; k = 1, \dots, o. \quad (5)$$

Also, the labor capacities cannot be exceeded, and the labor hours are nonnegative, so that

$$0 \leq l_j^i \leq \bar{l}_j^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, l; j = 1, \dots, n_i \quad (6)$$

and

$$0 \leq l_{jk}^i \leq \bar{l}_{jk}^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, l; j = 1, \dots, n_i; k = 1, \dots, o. \quad (7)$$

# Optimization Problems of the Competing Firms

Each firm  $i$ ;  $i = 1, \dots, I$ , seeks to maximize its utility,  $U^i$ , consisting of its net revenue, subject to its constraints. Therefore, the optimization problem faced by each firm  $i$ ;  $i = 1, \dots, I$ , is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Maximize } U^i = & \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \frac{\rho_k^i(d) Q_{jk}^i}{(1 + \tau_{jk}^i)} - \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} f_j^i(s) - \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \hat{c}_{jk}^i(Q) \\ & - \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} w_j^i l_j^i - \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o w_{jk}^i l_{jk}^i \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

subject to: (1) – (7) for  $i$ .

The first term in (8) represents the revenue under the ad valorem tariff rate.

# Some Reformulations

Because of expression (1), one can redefine the production cost functions (cf. Table 1) in terms of product shipments, thus:

$$\hat{f}_j^i = \hat{f}_j^i(Q) \equiv f_j^i(s), \quad i = 1, \dots, l; j = 1, \dots, n_i. \quad (9)$$

On the demand side, because of (2), one can redefine the demand price functions in terms of product shipments as:

$$\hat{\rho}_k^i = \hat{\rho}_k^i(Q) \equiv \rho_k^i(d), \quad i = 1, \dots, l; k = 1, \dots, o. \quad (10)$$

The production cost and the transportation cost functions are assumed to be convex and continuously differentiable and the demand price functions to be monotonically decreasing in demands, and continuously differentiable.

# Some Reformulations

We will also replace the labor variables in the firms' objective functions with their product shipment equivalents. Towards that end, in view of (4) and (1), we have that:

$$\frac{\sum_{k=1}^o Q_{jk}^i}{\beta_j^i} = l_j^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, I; j = 1, \dots, n_i. \quad (11)$$

Also, in view of (5), we have that

$$\frac{Q_{jk}^i}{\beta_{jk}^i} = l_{jk}^i, \quad i = 1, \dots, I; j = 1, \dots, n_i; k = 1, \dots, o. \quad (12)$$

# Optimization Problems in Production Shipment Variables

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Maximize } \hat{U}^i(Q) &= \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \frac{\hat{\rho}_k^i(Q) Q_{jk}^i}{(1 + \tau_{jk}^i)} - \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \hat{f}_j^i(Q) - \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \hat{c}_{jk}^i(Q) \\ &\quad - \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} w_j^i \frac{\sum_{k=1}^o Q_{jk}^i}{\beta_j^i} - \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o w_{jk}^i \frac{Q_{jk}^i}{\beta_{jk}^i} \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

subject to:

$$\frac{\sum_{k=1}^o Q_{jk}^i}{\beta_j^i} \leq \bar{l}_j^i, \quad j = 1, \dots, n_i, \quad (14)$$

$$\frac{Q_{jk}^i}{\beta_{jk}^i} \leq \bar{l}_{jk}^i, \quad j = 1, \dots, n_i; k = 1, \dots, o, \quad (15)$$

$$Q_{jk}^i \geq 0, \quad j = 1, \dots, n_i; k = 1, \dots, o. \quad (16)$$

**The utility functions of all the firms are assumed to be concave and continuously differentiable.**

We define the feasible sets:

$$K^i \equiv \{Q^i \mid Q^i \text{ satisfies (14) – (16)}\}, \quad i = 1, \dots, I \quad (17a)$$

and

$$K \equiv \prod_{i=1}^I K^i. \quad (17b)$$

## Definition 1: Global Supply Chain Network Nash Equilibrium Under Ad Valorem Tariffs

*A product shipment pattern  $Q^* \in K$  is a global supply chain network Nash Equilibrium under ad valorem tariffs if, for each firm  $i$ ;  $i = 1, \dots, I$ , the following equilibrium condition holds:*

$$\hat{U}^i(Q^{i*}, Q^{-i*}) \geq \hat{U}^i(Q^i, Q^{-i*}), \quad \forall Q^i \in K^i, \quad (18)$$

*where  $Q^{-i*} \equiv (Q^{1*}, \dots, Q^{i-1*}, Q^{i+1*}, \dots, Q^{I*})$ .*

According to (18), a Nash Equilibrium is established if no firm, unilaterally, with its selected strategies, can improve upon its utility, given the strategies of the other firms.

## Theorem 1: Variational Inequality Formulation of the Global Supply Chain Network Nash Equilibrium Under Ad Valorem Tariffs

A product shipment pattern  $Q^* \in K^i$  is a global supply chain network Nash Equilibrium under ad valorem tariffs according to Definition 1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:

$$-\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \frac{\partial \hat{U}^i(Q^*)}{\partial Q_{jk}^i} \times (Q_{jk}^i - Q_{jk}^{i*}) \geq 0, \quad \forall Q \in K. \quad (19)$$

## Theorem 2: Alternative Variational Inequality Formulations

VI (19) is equivalent to solving: determine

$(Q^*, \lambda^*, \mu^*, \epsilon^*) \in R_+^{\sum_{i=1}^I n_i o} + R_+^{\sum_{i=1}^I n_i} + R_+^{2 \sum_{i=1}^I n_i o}$  such that:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left[ - \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \frac{\partial \hat{U}^i(Q^*)}{\partial Q_{jk}^i} + \frac{\lambda_j^{i*}}{\beta_j^i} + \frac{\mu_{jk}^{i*}}{\beta_{jk}^i} - \epsilon_{jk}^{i*} \right] \times [Q_{jk}^i - Q_{jk}^{i*}] \\
 & + \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \left[ \bar{l}_j^i - \frac{\sum_{k=1}^o Q_{jk}^{i*}}{\beta_j^i} \right] \times [\lambda_j^i - \lambda_j^{i*}] \\
 & + \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ \bar{l}_{jk}^i - \frac{Q_{jk}^{i*}}{\beta_{jk}^i} \right] \times [\mu_{jk}^i - \mu_{jk}^{i*}] + \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o Q_{jk}^{i*} \times [\epsilon_{jk}^i - \epsilon_{jk}^{i*}] \geq 0, \\
 & \forall (Q, \lambda, \mu, \epsilon) \in R_+^{\sum_{i=1}^I n_i o + \sum_{i=1}^I n_i + 2 \sum_{i=1}^I n_i o}. \tag{20}
 \end{aligned}$$

# Alternative Variational Inequality Formulations

Or simplified as: determine  $(Q^*, \lambda^*, \mu^*) \in R_+^{2 \sum_{i=1}^I n_i o} + R_+^{\sum_{i=1}^I n_i}$  such that:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[ - \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \frac{\partial \hat{U}^i(Q^*)}{\partial Q_{jk}^i} + \frac{\lambda_j^{i*}}{\beta_j^i} + \frac{\mu_{jk}^{i*}}{\beta_{jk}^i} \right] \times [Q_{jk}^i - Q_{jk}^{i*}] \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \left[ \bar{l}_j^i - \frac{\sum_{k=1}^o Q_{jk}^{i*}}{\beta_j^i} \right] \times [\lambda_j^i - \lambda_j^{i*}] \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \sum_{k=1}^o \left[ \bar{l}_{jk}^i - \frac{Q_{jk}^{i*}}{\beta_{jk}^i} \right] \times [\mu_{jk}^i - \mu_{jk}^{i*}] \geq 0, \\ & \forall (Q, \lambda, \mu) \in R_+^{2 \sum_{i=1}^I n_i o + \sum_{i=1}^I n_i}. \quad (21) \end{aligned}$$

# Numerical Examples: Soybeans


- Soybeans are a leading agricultural commodity in global trade, widely used in livestock feed, plant-based foods, and biofuels, with the market valued at USD **169.65** billion in 2024 and projected to reach USD **255.39** billion by 2033.
- Global soybean trade is highly concentrated, with **Brazil, the United States, and Argentina** as leading exporters and **China** as the dominant importer, making the market particularly sensitive to tariff policies such as those observed during the 2018 US–China trade conflict.



# What Happened to US Soybean Farmers in 2025

- **US soybean purchases by China fell sharply in 2025:** after halting imports at the end of May, China resumed buying in November, but purchases totaled only **\$21.83 million**, more than **99%** below November 2024 levels.
- **Tariffs shifted China's soybean imports toward South America**, causing billions of dollars in lost sales for US soybean farmers.
- **The US government announced about \$11 billion in Farmer Bridge Payments** to support farmers, including soybean producers, affected by temporary trade disruptions and rising production costs.
- **Increased immigration crackdowns has created significant labor shortages in US agriculture**, where about **40%** of farmworkers are undocumented.

# Network Topology



**Figure:** The Soybean Supply Chain Network Topology for Examples 1, 2, 3, and 4

## Example 1: No Ad Valorem Tariffs - Data

- Two firms representing major **US** soybean exporters (stylized versions of Cargill and ADM). Firm 1 operates three production sites (**US, Brazil, Argentina**), while Firm 2 operates two (**US, Brazil**).
- The single demand market represents **China**, the world's largest soybean importer.
- Labor wages differ by country: highest in the **US** and lower in **Brazil** and **Argentina**.
- Ad valorem tariffs are zero:  $\tau_{jk}^i = 0$ .
- Labor productivity parameters and upper bounds:

$$\beta_j^i = 0.7, \forall i, j, \quad \beta_{jk}^i = 0.7, \forall i, j, k,$$

$$\bar{l}_{jk}^i = 3 \times 10^7, \forall i, j, k,$$

$$\bar{l}_2^1 = \bar{l}_2^2 = 3 \times 10^7, \quad \bar{l}_1^1 = \bar{l}_3^1 = \bar{l}_1^2 = 2 \times 10^7.$$

# Example 1: No Ad Valorem Tariffs - Functions

## Production Costs

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{f}_1^1(Q) &= 10^{-5}Q_{11}^1{}^2 + 90, & \hat{f}_2^1(Q) &= 4.3 \times 10^{-6}Q_{21}^1{}^2 + 80, \\ \hat{f}_3^1(Q) &= 7.3 \times 10^{-5}Q_{31}^1{}^2 + 100, & \hat{f}_1^2(Q) &= 1.8 \times 10^{-5}Q_{11}^2{}^2 + 90, \\ & & \hat{f}_2^2(Q) &= 9 \times 10^{-6}Q_{21}^2{}^2 + 80.\end{aligned}$$

## Transportation Costs

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{c}_{11}^1(Q) &= 2 \times 10^{-5}Q_{11}^1{}^2 + 40, & \hat{c}_{21}^1(Q) &= 5 \times 10^{-6}Q_{21}^1{}^2 + 30, \\ \hat{c}_{31}^1(Q) &= 6 \times 10^{-5}Q_{31}^1{}^2 + 45, & \hat{c}_{11}^2(Q) &= 10^{-5}Q_{11}^2{}^2 + 30, \\ & & \hat{c}_{21}^2(Q) &= 4 \times 10^{-6}Q_{21}^2{}^2 + 15.\end{aligned}$$

## Demand Prices

$$\begin{aligned}\rho_1^1(d) &= -1.8 \times 10^{-5}d_1^1 - 10^{-5}d_1^2 + 950, \\ \rho_1^2(d) &= -10^{-5}d_1^1 - 2.5 \times 10^{-5}d_1^2 + 1050.\end{aligned}$$

# Discussion of Results: Example 1

- Exports from Brazilian production sites exceed those from US sites, consistent with observed global soybean trade patterns and the real-world trade shares of major firms such as Cargill and ADM.
- Labor allocation follows production scale, with the largest number of workers employed at Brazilian production sites.
- Demand prices in China are \$531.16 per ton for Firm 1 and \$569.77 per ton for Firm 2, both broadly consistent with observed soybean import price of \$463.
- Firm 1 earns higher profits due to its larger production scale, and all Lagrange multipliers associated with labor constraints are zero, indicating that no labor constraints bind at equilibrium.

## Example 2: China's Retaliatory Ad Valorem Tariff on US Soybean Exports

- In Example 2, the data are the same as in Example 1 except that we now examine the impact of a newly imposed **25% ad valorem tariff by China on US soybean imports**, announced in April 2025 in direct response to US tariff measures earlier that month.
- The supply chain network structure remains as in Example 1, but we incorporate an ad valorem tariff rate on shipments from US production sites of both firms:

$$\tau_{11}^1 = \tau_{11}^2 = 0.25.$$

## Discussion of Results: Example 2

- A 25% Chinese tariff rate **reduces the competitiveness of US soybean exports, causing shipments from US sites to decline and shifting production toward Brazil and Argentina.**
- For Firm 1, exports from the US site drop by 22.26%, while shipments from the US site for Firm 2 decline by 20.44%.
- **Demand prices in China increase as total soybean supply declines, reaching \$536.62 and \$577.10 per ton for the two firms.**
- Labor hours fall at US production sites and on transportation routes but rise in Brazil and Argentina.
- **Profits decline for both firms, by 3.64% for Firm 1 and by 5.76% for Firm 2, despite the reallocation of production.**
- All Lagrange multipliers remain zero in this example.

# Who Wins, Who Loses?

- Producers in countries that tariffs on goods are imposed on generally have lower profits because of tariffs.
- Consumers can expect higher prices on products in countries that tariff products and a lower volume of the products. **This is especially concerning in terms of agricultural products and can lead to heightened food insecurity.**

## Example 3: Immigration Policy and its Impact on Available Labor at the US Production Sites

- Example 3 has the same data as that in Example 1, except that we now examine the impact of the current **farm labor shortage in the US due to increased immigration enforcement**.
- In 2025, intensified immigration enforcement and the failure to renew working authorizations led to an estimated **70%** of the agricultural workforce in key regions, especially California, stopping work.
- To simulate the labor shortage, we reduce the available labor hours at both firms' US production sites to  $\bar{l}_1^1 = \bar{l}_1^2 = 2 \times 10^6$  hours.

## Discussion of Results: Example 3

- **Reduced labor availability at US production sites significantly disrupts soybean output for both firms.**
- **US shipments decline sharply:** by 54.32% for Firm 1 and 59.95% for Firm 2, with labor constraints binding at the US sites.
- **Positive Lagrange multipliers ( $\lambda_1^{1*} = 85.10$ ,  $\lambda_1^{2*} = 108.28$ ) indicate that the labor upper bounds are binding.**
- **Both firms reallocate production towards Brazil and Argentina**, increasing shipments and labor usage at these sites and their associated transportation routes.
- Demand declines slightly while demand prices increase to \$545.31 and \$590.51 per ton.
- **Profits change, but modestly, due to international production reallocation.**

# Example 4: Combined Impact of Ad Valorem Tariffs Imposed on US and Brazilian Drought-Induced Production Cost Increases

- Example 4 has the same data as Example 1, except we consider two shocks:
  - China imposes a **25% ad valorem tariff rate** on US soybean imports:

$$\tau_{11}^1 = \tau_{11}^2 = 0.25.$$

- **Drought** conditions in Brazil **increase production costs** at Brazilian sites:

## New Production Cost Functions at Brazilian Sites

$$\hat{f}_2^1(Q) = 7 \times 10^{-6} (Q_{21}^1)^2 + 150, \quad \hat{f}_2^2(Q) = 1.3 \times 10^{-5} (Q_{21}^2)^2 + 150.$$

## Discussion of Results: Example 4

- The combined shock of a 25% ad valorem tariff and higher Brazilian production costs reallocates global soybean trade flows.
- US exports increase relative to Example 2 but remain below the Example 1 as firms partially shift production back to the US.
- Brazilian exports decline by 7% at both firms, due to higher production costs, while Argentine shipments increase by 19.06% relative to Example 1.
- Labor allocation follows the same pattern: declining in Brazil, increasing in Argentina, with US labor higher than in Example 2 and lower than Example 1.
- Demand prices reach their highest levels, \$557.20 and \$600.36, while demands and profits fall to their lowest levels.
- All Lagrange multipliers remain zero.

# Results - Equilibrium Product Flows and Labor Hours at the Production Sites and Transportation Routes

	Example 1	Example 2	Example 3	Example 4
$Q_{11}^{1*}$	3,065,167.00	2,382,688.56	1,400,000.00	2,850,274.69
$Q_{21}^{1*}$	12,268,105.34	12,736,900.30	13,433,546.57	11,332,297.71
$Q_{31}^{1*}$	863,239.02	896,019.96	944,735.71	1,027,857.05
$Q_{11}^{2*}$	3,496,410.27	2,781,649.05	1,400,000.00	3,331,122.34
$Q_{21}^{2*}$	9,234,026.64	9,728,068.38	10,668,295.98	8,570,370.78
$l_{11}^{1*}$	4,378,810.01	3,403,840.80	2,000,000.00	4,071,820.99
$l_{21}^{1*}$	17,525,864.77	18,195,571.86	19,190,780.81	16,188,996.73
$l_{31}^{1*}$	1,233,198.61	1,280,028.51	1,349,622.44	1,468,367.22
$l_{11}^{2*}$	4,994,871.82	3,973,784.35	2,000,000.00	4,758,746.20
$l_{21}^{2*}$	13,191,466.63	13,897,240.55	15,240,422.83	12,243,386.84
$l_1^{1*}$	4,378,810.01	3,403,840.80	2,000,000.00	4,071,820.99
$l_2^{1*}$	17,525,864.77	18,195,571.86	19,190,780.81	16,188,996.73
$l_3^{1*}$	1,233,198.61	1,280,028.51	1,349,622.44	1,468,367.22
$l_1^{2*}$	4,994,871.82	3,973,784.35	2,000,000.00	4,758,746.20
$l_2^{2*}$	13,191,466.63	13,897,240.55	15,240,422.83	12,243,386.84

# Results - Demand Prices, Demands, and Profits

	<b>Example 1</b>	<b>Example 2</b>	<b>Example 3</b>	<b>Example 4</b>
$d_1^{1*}$	16,196,511.37	16,015,608.82	15,778,282.28	15,210,429.45
$d_1^{2*}$	12,730,436.91	12,509,717.43	12,068,295.98	11,901,493.13
$\hat{\rho}_1^1$	531.16	536.62	545.31	557.20
$\hat{\rho}_1^2$	569.77	577.10	590.51	600.36
$\hat{U}^1$	6,502,623,987.76	6,265,508,717.39	6,507,263,407.57	5,933,698,880.38
$\hat{U}^2$	5,502,368,550.04	5,185,244,846.39	5,392,080,170.32	4,902,279,307.20

# Additional Insights from Our Research

- Specifically, from the consumer's perspective, the results consistently and unanimously show that consumer welfare declines for consumers in the country imposing a strict quota or tariff on an imported product. Hence, a government may wish to loosen a quota (equivalently, reduce a tariff) so as not to adversely affect its own consumers.
- Producing firms, as also critical stakeholders in competitive supply chain networks, should expand their demand markets within their own countries. This allows for a basic, but, effective, redesign of the supply chain network under a tariff or quota and results in higher profits for the firms.
- Also, firms should expand the number of production sites to countries not under a tariff or quota to maintain or improve upon their profits if some of their production sites are in countries subject to such trade policy instruments.

# What Our Research Has Shown

**Whether in the context of supply chain networks under oligopolistic (imperfect) competition or perfect competition, our studies reveal that tariffs:**

- increase prices for consumers;
- reduce the volume of the product;
- decrease consumer welfare;
- reduce profits for producers (unless new markets and production sites can be identified), and
- they can result in the same impacts as that of quotas.

**Tariffs can, however, offer some protection to domestic producers but one has to evaluate whether this will happen quantitatively through OR models.**

# Rerouting to Avoid Tariffs


# Producers' Reactions to Tariffs

- Producing countries (and firms therein) have responded to tariffs in additional ways including through **nearshoring**; that is, moving production closer, or **onshoring** (producing within one's country).
- Another response is **rerouting** products through third countries, with **alteration of the origin country** through documentation and without substantive addition of value to the products, a practice that, although **illegal**, may happen and the economic trade-offs are worth quantifying and exploring.




# Our Paper

The paper, “Multicommodity Trade, Tariffs, and Rerouting,” A. Nagurney and S. Samira, is in press in the (2026) book in honor of Terry Rockafellar.



- In this paper, we introduce a new multicommodity trade model based on spatial price equilibrium in which multicommodity tariffs can be imposed by destination countries on the commodities based on their country of origin. Through the introduction of **path tariffs** we are able to identify equilibrium conditions that allow for the **rerouting of commodities in order to evade tariffs**.
- We allow for **multiple trade routes**; that is, paths, between country origin nodes and country destination nodes, and these paths can consist of **one or more links**.
- The links, in turn, in the case of rerouting of the commodity through countries to evade a tariff, can correspond to **transportation links or repackaging/reprocessing links**. For the sake of generality, we consider links to be transaction links, with associated costs.

# Some Highlights from Our Rerouting Study



**Figure:** An Example of a Spatial Price Network Topology with Origin Countries and Destination Countries

# Some Highlights from Our Rerouting Study

- We present both illustrative examples and algorithmically solved ones using the modified projection method, which expand on the former examples. **The application is that of trade of tea from China with rerouting through Vietnam.**
- The results reinforce, in part, what we have found in the context of agricultural trade from Ukraine in wartime - that having alternative trade routes is beneficial.
- **The results also reinforce that consumers in the country imposing a tariff lose in terms of the higher demand price, and the lower volume of commodity shipment.**
- Producers in the country whose product is tariffed, also lose, since the supply market price decreases.

## Some Related Recent Research

# Some Related Recent Research


In addition to tariffs and impacts, our recent research has also involved the modeling and calculation of integrated crop and cargo war risk insurance.



The numerical case study is on wheat and corn trade.

# Some Related Recent Research

Plus, we have been modeling quality impacts on fresh produce of capacity disruptions and transportation delays in international trade.



The numerical case study is on the banana trade.

# Making a Positive Impact

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## How disaster relief efforts could be improved with game theory

March 9, 2017 11:24am EST



Author  
**Anna Nagurny**  
Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies, University of Massachusetts Lowell

Business & Economics  
Anna Nagurny, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of leadership studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell. She has published articles on leadership and organizational behavior in several journals. She is also a frequent speaker at conferences and seminars on leadership and organizational behavior.

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The number of disasters has doubled globally since the 1980s, with the

Chicago Tribune

Response to natural disasters like Harvey could be helped with game theory

By Anna Nagurny  
@annanagurny

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**(T**he Conversation is an independent and award-winning source of news, analysis and commentary from academic experts.)

Anna Nagurny, University of Massachusetts Amherst  
(THE CONVERSATION) The devastation by Hurricane Harvey continues, with the National Weather Service calling the event unprecedented, thus making the response even more complicated.  
Nearly half a million people are expected to seek shelter and to be affected by the Category 4 hurricane, which already has damaged more than 300 inches on the coastline.

SALON VIDEO NEWS POLITICS ENTERTAINMENT LIFE

THURSDAY, AUG 31, 2017 10:38 AM EST

## Time for some game theory: How responses to natural disasters like Harvey could be improved

The damage and losses from natural disasters are estimated to cost us \$100 billion a year since 2000

ANNA NAGURNY, THE CONVERSATION

Homeland Security News Wire

BIOMETER'S BORDER, IMMIG, BUSINESS CYBERSECURITY  
PUBLIC SAFETY PUBLIC HEALTH REGIONAL SCIENCE


Yale Cyber Leadership Forum - March 30 - April 1, 2017  
Expanding the digital frontier with a new course, the Cyber Leadership Forum is a collaboration between Yale and the Center for Cyber Security.

Disaster response  
How disaster relief efforts could be improved with game theory  
By Anna Nagurny  
Published on March 2017

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The number of disasters has doubled globally since the 1980s, with the damage and losses estimated at an average

# Coverage by the Media





# Writing OpEds in the Pandemic

On August 4, 2020, I published an article in *The Conversation*,


**“The Raging Competition for Medical Supplies is not a Game, but Game Theory Can Help.”**



On September 18, 2020, I published another article in *The Conversation*,

**“Keeping Coronavirus Vaccines at Subzero Temperatures During Distribution Will Be Hard, but Likely Key to Ending Pandemic.”**

# Writing OpEds in the Pandemic



On April 5, 2021, I published the article,

**“Today’s Global Economy Runs on Standardized Containers, as the Ever Given Fiasco Illustrates,”** also in *The Conversation*.

On September 21, 2021, my article,

**“Global Shortage of Shipping Containers Highlights Their Importance in Getting Goods to Amazon Warehouses, Store Shelves and Your Door in Time for Christmas,”** appeared in *The Conversation*. It has had over 330,000 reads.

# Writings After the Full-Scale Invasion



IndustryWeek  
INTELLIGENCE TALENT TECHNOLOGY & ART OPERATIONS LEADERSHIP

## After One Year of War, How Is Ukraine Managing?

APR 16, 2023  
Signs of economic resilience include a functioning banking system and a thriving IT sector.



## The Messenger Opinion.

It's time to break the news.

### OPINION

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE MESSENGER

## To Plant or Not to Plant? For Ukrainian Farmers, It's Life or Death

Published 06/11/23 09:30 AM ET | Updated  
Anna Nagurney

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES

## Ukraine's Students

TO THE EDITOR:

Re "For Children of War, a Time for Play" (news article and photo essay, Aug. 8):

As children, their families and teachers get excited about the new school year throughout the world, it is imperative



## Operations Research for the Recovery and Reconstruction of Ukraine

By Anna Nagurney



OTHER VIEWS COMMENTARY

## Ukraine will need 'Marshall Plan' to address human toll of war

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### OPINION

#### LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## Scholars from Ukraine, UMass find common ground

# Some of My Media Interviews in the Pandemic



# Some of the Media Interviews on the War on Ukraine

## Economic dangers from Russia's invasion ripple across globe

By PAUL WISEMAN and DAVID MCHUGH March 2, 2022



Feedstuffs went live.  
March 16 at 2:00 p.m.



The war in Ukraine is no longer just a story about a conflict between nations. It's having an immedi...

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Anna Nagurney with John Moore



The John Bachelor Show

1/2: #Ukraine: The Kyiv School of Economics is open for business under fire. Paul Gregory @HooverInst @PaulR\_Gregory. Anna Nagurney @Supernetworks, University of Massachusetts. Paul Becker, Duke University

## Russian war in world's 'breadbasket' threatens food supply

By JOSEPH WILSON, SAMY MAGDY, AYA BATRAWY and CHINEDU ASADU March 6, 2022

## 'I fear a cultural genocide'; Ukrainians in Western Mass. watch, worry and help

Published: Feb. 28, 2022, 5:55 p.m.



## Threat of Russian cyber attacks likely for not just Ukraine, but also in the US

### *No Ikea Shelves, No Levis: The Retail Exodus From Russia Is On*

Since the invasion of Ukraine began, the increasing financial and reputational risks of doing business in Russia are leading Western brands to halt operations.

### Russian Sanctions Snarl Shipping Even as Pandemic Pressure Eases



March 11, 2022  
Liz Alderman and Jerry Gross

# Responding to Media Requests on Tariffs

I believe that it is important to respond to media requests on topics that your research can inform, such as that of our work on tariffs and trade.

wbur  
From vinegar to vanilla: Trump tariffs leave Massachusetts small businesses in the lurch

Tariff impact is already felt by Western Massachusetts companies

NEWSTALK WHMP

The New York Times  
*Trump's Tariffs Would Deal a Big Blow to the Auto Industry*  
Automakers and parts suppliers would struggle if President-elect Donald J. Trump followed through on his threat to impose 25 percent tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico.

MASS LIVE


Daily Hampshire Gazette  
Dash to the dealership?: Local consumers, car sellers brace for auto tariffs to kick in Wednesday

Dynamics of Decision

Computable mathematical models and associated analyses on tariffs and trade can provide valuable insights (including unexpected ones) for policy-makers and decision-makers.

**On April 22, 2020, a letter from California Attorney General Xavier Becerra to Admiral Brett Giroir, the Assistant Secretary of the US Department of Health & Human Services, and signed by US Attorney Generals of 21 other states, requested updates, because of the pandemic blood shortages, to blood donation policies that discriminate.**

**My March 2020 article in *The Conversation*, which was reprinted in LiveScience, was the first reference and was cited on the first page.**



**Xavier Becerra, then CA Attorney General, became the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the US under President Biden!**

# Thank You Very Much!



## The Virtual Center for Supernetworks



*Supernetworks for Optimal Decision-Making and Improving the Global Quality of Life*

Director's Welcome	About the Director	Projects	Supernetworks Laboratory	Center Associates	Media Coverage	Braess Paradox
Downloadable Articles	Visuals	Audio/Video	Books	Commentaries & OpEds	The Supernetwork Sentinel	Congratulations & Kudos



**The Virtual Center for Supernetworks** is an interdisciplinary center at the Isenberg School of Management that advances knowledge on large-scale networks and integrates operations research and management science, engineering, and economics. Its Director is Dr. Anna Nagurney, the Eugene M. Isenberg Chair in Integrative Studies.

**Mission:** The Virtual Center for Supernetworks fosters the study and application of supernetworks and serves as a resource on networks ranging from transportation and logistics, including supply chains, and the Internet, to a spectrum of economic networks.

**The Applications of Supernetworks Include:** decision-making, optimization, and game theory; supply chain management; critical infrastructure from transportation to electric power networks; financial networks; knowledge and social networks; energy, the environment, and sustainability; cybersecurity; Future Internet Architectures; risk management; network vulnerability, resiliency, and performance metrics; humanitarian logistics and healthcare.

Announcements and Notes	Photos of Center Activities	Photos of Network Innovators	Friends of the Center	Course Lectures	Fulbright Lectures	UMass Amherst INFORMS Student Chapter
Professor Anna Nagurney's Blog	Network Classics	Doctoral Dissertations	Conferences	Journals	Societies	Archive

More information on our work can be found on the  
Supernetwork Center site:

<https://supernet.isenberg.umass.edu/>