

Lecture 8: Perishable Product Supply Chains in Healthcare

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Healthcare Supply Chains






Supply chains may be characterized by **decentralized decision-making** associated with the different economic agents or by **centralized** decision-making.

Supply chains are, in fact, **Supernetworks**.

Hence, any formalism that seeks to model supply chains and to provide quantifiable insights and measures must be a system-wide one and network-based.

Such crucial issues as the stability and resiliency of supply chains, as well as their adaptability and responsiveness to events in **a global environment of increasing risk and uncertainty** can only be rigorously examined from the view of supply chains as network systems.

Our Approach to Supply Chain Network Analysis and Design



The Pharmaceutical Industry and Issues

The Pharmaceutical Industry

Pharmaceutical, that is, medicinal drug, manufacturing is **an immense global industry**.

In 2008, the global pharmaceutical revenue came to some \$712 billion based on quarterly exchange rates. In 2014, the total revenues of the pharmaceutical market stood at almost \$940 billion worldwide (Statista (2015)).

In 2014, the total spending in the U.S. on medicines was \$372 billion.

The Pharmaceutical Industry

Although pharmaceutical supply chains have begun to be coupled with sophisticated technologies in order to improve both the quantity and the quality of their associated products, despite all the advances in manufacturing, storage, and distribution methods, **pharmaceutical drug companies are far from effectively satisfying market demands on a consistent basis.**

In fact, it has been argued that pharmaceutical drug supply chains are **in urgent need of efficient optimization techniques in order to reduce costs and to increase productivity and responsiveness** (Shah (2004) and Papageorgiou (2009)).

Pharmaceutical Product Perishability

Product perishability is another critical issue in pharmaceutical / drug supply chains.

- In a 2003 survey, the estimated loss incurred **due to the expiration of branded products in supermarkets and drug stores was over 500 million dollars.**
- In 2007, in a warehouse belonging to the Health Department of Chicago, **over one million dollars in drugs, vaccines, and other medical supplies were found spoiled, stolen, or unaccounted for.**
- In 2009, CVS pharmacies in California, as a result of a settlement of a lawsuit filed against the company, had to offer promotional coupons to customers who had identified expired drugs, including expired baby formula and children's medicines, **in more than 42 percent of the stores** surveyed the year before.

Product Shortages

Ironically, whereas some drugs may be unsold and unused and / or past their expiration dates, According to *The New York Times*, January 29, 2016, **shortages of all sorts of drugs anesthetics, painkillers, antibiotics, cancer treatments have become the new normal in American medicine. The American Society of Health-System Pharmacists currently lists inadequate supplies of more than 150 drugs and therapeutics, for reasons ranging from manufacturing problems to federal safety crackdowns to drugmakers abandoning low-profit products.**

Medical institutions, include the Cleveland Clinic, have had to resort to rationing of medicines for patients.

Two key prevention strategies, with support of the FDA, that can help to drive a decrease in shortages, 1) early notification, and 2) a focus on manufacturing quality.

- More than 80% of the ingredients of drugs sold in the U.S. are made overseas, mostly in remote facilities located in China and India that are rarely – if not ever – visited by government inspectors.
- Supply chains of generic drugs, which account for 75% of the prescription medicines sold in the U.S., are, typically, more susceptible to falsification with the supply chains of some of the over-the-counter products, such as vitamins or aspirins, also vulnerable to adulteration.
- **The amount of counterfeit drugs in the European pharmaceutical supply chains has considerably increased.**

In the past, product recalls were mainly related to local errors in design, manufacturing, or labeling, **a single product safety issue may result in huge global consequences.**



Some Consequences of Product Shortages

The consequences of pharmaceutical shortages **include the postponement of surgeries and treatments, and may also result in the use of less effective or costlier substitutes.**

According to the American Hospital Association, all US hospitals have experienced drug shortages, and 82% have reported delayed care for their patients as a consequence (Szabo (2011)).

H1N1 (Swine) Flu

As of May 2, 2010, worldwide, more than **214** countries and overseas territories or communities reported laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009, including over **18,001** deaths (www.who.int).

Parts of the globe experienced serious flu vaccine shortages, both seasonal and H1N1 (swine) ones, in late 2009.



Disaster Preparedness for Pandemics and Influenza

URL is <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zlu2hn11Ddw&lr=1>

Click on underlined text:

Disaster Preparedness for Pandemics and Influenza

An Example of a Critical Medicine Shortage – Cytarabine

In the past year, the US experienced shortages of **critical drug, cytarabine, due to manufacturer production problems.**



Due to the severity of this medical crisis for leukemia patients, Food and Drug Administration is exploring the possibility of importing this medical product (Larkin (2011)).

Hospira re-entered the market in March 2011 and has made the manufacture of cytarabine a priority ahead of other products.

Another Example of a Critical Vaccine Shortage – for Cholera

According to Potenza (2016): Haiti is in the middle of a cholera crisis, and after Hurricane Matthew hit the Caribbean island in mid October 2016, things are likely to get worse. To try to stem some of the spread of disease, the World Health Organization (WHO) is sending 1 million doses of a cholera vaccine.

It is still not enough to protect all the Haitians who are at risk of contracting the deadly disease.

Another Example of a Critical Vaccine Shortage – for Cholera


The WHO isn't sending more cholera vaccines because supplies worldwide are severely limited. Last Fall, 2.2 million doses had been stockpiled by worldwide health authorities for an estimated 1.4 billion people who are at risk of cholera. In Haiti alone, 10 million people are at risk, and more than 400 suspected cholera cases were reported in October in the areas most affected by the Hurricane. Because vaccination requires two doses per person, the current worldwide supply can cover only a little over 1 million people.

Until recently, the global public health community was reluctant to use vaccines against cholera. In Haiti itself, where the current outbreak began in 2010, policymakers initially rejected vaccination as a tactic. As of 2016, thousands of people have been infected including more than 700 new cases per week in 2016 and almost 10,000 have died. **Hurricane Matthew is expected to create a spike in the number of cases.**

Medical Nuclear Product Supply Chains

Technetium, ^{99m}Tc , which is a decay product of Molybdenum, ^{99}Mo , is the most commonly used medical radioisotope, accounting for over 80% of the radioisotope injections and representing over 30 million procedures worldwide each year.

There have been shortages of this critical radioisotope due to nuclear production problems.



Some Possible Causes of Shortages

While the causes of many shortages are complex, most cases appear to be related to manufacturers' decisions to cease production in the presence of financial challenges.

It is interesting to note that, among curative cancer drugs, only the older generic, yet, less expensive, ones, have experienced shortages.

As noted by Shah (2004), pharmaceutical companies secure notable returns solely in the early lifetime of a successful drug, before competition takes place. This competition-free time-span, however, has been observed to be shortening, from 5 years to only 1-2 years.

Some Possible Causes of Shortages

Hence, the low profit margins associated with such drugs may be forcing pharmaceutical companies to make a difficult decision: whether to lose money by continuing to produce a lifesaving product or to switch to a more profitable drug.

Unfortunately, the FDA cannot force companies to continue to produce low-profit medicines even if millions of lives rely on them.

On the other hand, where competition has been lacking, shortages of some other lifesaving drugs have resulted in spikes in prices, ranging from a 100% to a 4,500% increase with an average of 650% (Schneider (2011)).

Economic and Financial Pressures

Pharmaceutical companies suffered a significant decrease in their revenues as a result of losing patent protection for ten of the best-selling drugs by the end of 2012 (De la Garza (2011)).

These included Lipitor and Plavix, that generated before then more than \$142 billion in sales, and, over the next five years, will be faced with generic competition.

In 2011, pharmaceutical products valued at more than \$30 billion lost patent protection.

- More than 80% of the ingredients of drugs sold in the US are made overseas, mostly in remote facilities located in China and India that are rarely – if not ever – visited by government inspectors.
- Supply chains of generic drugs, which account for 75 percent of the prescription medicines sold in the US, are, typically, more susceptible to falsification with the supply chains of some of the over-the-counter products, such as vitamins or aspirins, also vulnerable to adulteration.
- The amount of counterfeit drugs in the European pharmaceutical supply chains has considerably increased.

In the past, product recalls were mainly related to local errors in design, manufacturing, or labeling, *a single product safety issue may result in huge global consequences.*



Waste and Environmental Impacts

Another pressure faced by pharmaceutical firms is the environmental impact of their medical waste, which includes the perished excess medicine, and inappropriate disposal on the retailer / consumer end.



A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

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A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

The supply chain generalized network oligopoly model has the following novel features:

1. it handles the perishability of the pharmaceutical product through the introduction of arc multipliers;
2. it allows each firm to minimize the discarding cost of waste / perished medicine;
3. it captures product differentiation under oligopolistic competition through the branding of drugs, which can also include generics as distinct brands.

A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

References can be found in the paper, A supply chain generalized network oligopoly model for pharmaceuticals under brand differentiation and perishability, A. H. Masoumi, M. Yu, and A. Nagurney, *Transportation Research E* 48: (2012), pp 762-780.

A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

The supply chain network model can be applied to similar cases of oligopolistic competition in which a finite number of firms provide perishable products.

However, proper minor modifications may have to be made in order to address differences in the supply chain network topologies in related industries.

Some Examples of Oligopolies

- ▶ **airlines**
- ▶ **freight carriers**
- ▶ **automobile manufacturers**
- ▶ **oil companies**
- ▶ **beer / beverage companies**
- ▶ **wireless communications**
- ▶ **fast fashion brands**
- ▶ **certain food companies.**

A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

We consider I pharmaceutical firms, with a typical firm denoted by i .

The firms compete non-cooperatively, in an oligopolistic manner, and the consumers can differentiate among the products of the pharmaceutical firms through their individual product brands.

The supply chain network activities include manufacturing, shipment, storage, and, ultimately, the distribution of the brand name drugs to the demand markets.

Pharmaceutical Firm 1

Pharmaceutical Firm I




Figure: The Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Network Topology

A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

Each pharmaceutical firm i ; $i = 1, \dots, I$, utilizes n_M^i manufacturing plants and n_D^i distribution / storage facilities, and the goal is to serve n_R demand markets consisting of pharmacies, retail stores, hospitals, and other medical centers.

L^i denotes the set of directed links corresponding to the sequence of activities associated with firm i . Also, $G = [N, L]$ denotes the graph composed of the set of nodes N , and the set of links L , where L contains all sets of L_i s: $L \equiv \cup_{i=1, \dots, I} L^i$.

A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

In the Figure, the first set of links connecting the top two tiers of nodes corresponds to the process of production of the drugs at each of the manufacturing units of firm i ; $i = 1, \dots, I$. Such facilities are denoted by $M_1^i, \dots, M_{n_M^i}^i$, respectively, for firm i .

We emphasize that the manufacturing facilities may be located not only in different regions of the same country but also in different countries.

A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

The next set of nodes represents the distribution centers, and, thus, the links connecting the manufacturing nodes to the distribution centers are shipment-type links. Such distribution nodes associated with firm i ; $i = 1, \dots, I$ are denoted by $D_{1,1}^i, \dots, D_{n_D^i,1}^i$ and represent the distribution centers that the produced drugs are shipped to, and stored at, before being delivered to the demand markets.

There are alternative shipment links to denote different possible modes of transportation. In the shipment of pharmaceuticals that are perishable one may wish, for example, to ship by air, but at a higher cost.

A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

The next set of links connecting nodes $D_{1,1}^i, \dots, D_{n_D,1}^i$ to $D_{1,2}^i, \dots, D_{n_D,2}^i$; $i = 1, \dots, I$ represents the process of storage.

Since drugs may require different storage conditions / technologies before being ultimately shipped to the demand markets, we represent these alternatives through multiple links at this tier.

The last set of links connecting the two bottom tiers of the supply chain network corresponds to distribution links over which the stored products are shipped from the distribution / storage facilities to the demand markets. Here we also allow for multiple modes of shipment / transportation.

A Generalized Network Oligopoly Model for Pharmaceutical Supply Chains

There are direct links connecting manufacturing units with various demand markets in order to capture the possibility of direct mail shipments from manufacturers and the costs should be adjusted (see below) accordingly.

While representing a small percentage of the total filled prescriptions (about 6.1 percent in 2004), mail-order pharmacy sales remained the fastest-growing sector of the US prescription drug retail market in 2004, increasing by 18 percent over the preceding year (The Health Strategies Consultancy LLC (2005)).

How We Handle Perishability

Although pharmaceutical products may have different life-times, we can assign a multiplier to each activity / link of the supply chain to represent the fraction of the product that may perish / be wasted / be lost over the course of that activity.

The fraction of lost product depends on the type of the activity since various processes of manufacturing, shipment, storage, and distribution may result in dissimilar amounts of losses.

How We Handle Perishability

In addition, this fraction need not be the same among various links of the same tier in the supply chain network since different firms and even different units of the same firm may experience non-identical amounts of waste, depending on the brand of drug, the efficiency of the utilized technology, and the experience of the staff, etc.

Also, such multipliers can capture pilferage / theft, a significant issue in drug supply chains.

How We Handle Perishability

As in Nagurney, Masoumi, and Yu (2011), we associate with every link a in the supply chain network, a multiplier α_a , which lies in the range of $(0,1]$. The parameter α_a may be interpreted as a throughput factor corresponding to link a meaning that $\alpha_a \times 100\%$ of the initial flow of product on link a reaches the successor node of that link.

Let f_a denote the (initial) flow of product on link a with f'_a denoting the final flow on link a ; i.e., the flow that reaches the successor node of the link after wastage has taken place. Therefore, we have:

$$f'_a = \alpha_a f_a, \quad \forall a \in L. \quad (1)$$

Consequently, the waste / loss on link a , denoted by w_a , which is the difference between the initial and the final flow, can be derived as:

$$w_a = f_a - f'_a = (1 - \alpha_a) f_a, \quad \forall a \in L. \quad (2)$$

How We Handle Perishability

Associated with the medical waste, w_a , is a discarding cost, y_a , which is a function of flow on that link, f_a :

$$y_a(w_a) = y_a(f_a - f'_a) = y_a((1 - \alpha_a)f_a), \quad \forall a \in L. \quad (3a)$$

The parameter α_a is assumed to be constant and known a priori; therefore, a new total discarding cost function, \hat{z}_a , is defined accordingly, which is a function of the flow, f_a , and is assumed to be convex and continuously differentiable:

$$\hat{z}_a = \hat{z}_a(f_a), \quad \forall a \in L. \quad (3b)$$

How We Handle Perishability

Let x_p represent the (initial) flow of product on path p joining an origin node, i , with a destination node, R_k . The path flows must be nonnegative, that is,

$$x_p \geq 0, \quad \forall p \in P_k^i; i = 1, \dots, I; k = 1, \dots, n_R, \quad (4)$$

where P_k^i is the set of all paths joining the origin node i ; $i = 1, \dots, I$ with destination node R_k .

Also, μ_p denotes the multiplier corresponding to the throughput on path p , defined as the product of all link multipliers on links comprising that path, that is,

$$\mu_p \equiv \prod_{a \in p} \alpha_a, \quad \forall p \in P_k^i; i = 1, \dots, I; k = 1, \dots, n_R. \quad (5)$$

How We Handle Perishability

We define the multiplier, α_{ap} , which is the product of the multipliers of the links on path p that precede link a in that path, as follows:

$$\alpha_{ap} \equiv \begin{cases} \delta_{ap} \prod_{a' < a} \alpha_{a'}, & \text{if } \{a' < a\} \neq \emptyset, \\ \delta_{ap}, & \text{if } \{a' < a\} = \emptyset, \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

where $\{a' < a\}$ denotes the set of the links preceding link a in path p , and \emptyset denotes the null set. In addition, δ_{ap} is defined as equal to 1 if link a is contained in path p , and 0, otherwise. As a result, α_{ap} is equal to the product of all link multipliers preceding link a in path p . If link a is not contained in path p , then α_{ap} is set to zero. If a belongs to the first set of links; i.e., the manufacturing links, this multiplier is equal to 1.

How We Handle Perishability

Hence, the relationship between the link flow, f_a , and the path flows can be expressed as:

$$f_a = \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{k=1}^{n_R} \sum_{p \in P_k^i} x_p \alpha_{ap}, \quad \forall a \in L. \quad (7)$$

How We Handle Perishability

Note that the arc multipliers may be obtained from historical and statistical data.

They may also, in the case of certain perishable products, be related to an exponential time decay function where the time, in our framework, is associated with each specific link activity (see, for instance, Blackburn and Scudder (2009) and Bai and Kendall (2009)).

For example, Nagurney and Nagurney (2011) constructed explicit arc multipliers for molybdenum, which is used in nuclear medicine, which were based on the physics of time decay for this pharmaceutical product used in cancer and cardiac diagnostics, among other procedures.

How We Handle Perishability

Let d_{ik} denote the demand for pharmaceutical firm i 's brand drug; $i = 1, \dots, I$, at demand market R_k ; $k = 1, \dots, n_R$. The consumers differentiate the products by their brands.

The following equation reveals the relationship between the path flows and the demands in the supply chain network:

$$\sum_{p \in P_k^i} x_p \mu_p = d_{ik}, \quad i = 1, \dots, I; k = 1, \dots, n_R, \quad (8)$$

that is, the demand for a brand drug at the demand market R_k is equal to the sum of all the final flows – subject to perishability – on paths joining (i, R_k) . We group the demands d_{ik} ; $i = 1, \dots, I$; $k = 1, \dots, n_R$ into the $n_R \times I$ -dimensional vector d .

The Demand Price Functions

A demand price function is associated with each firm's pharmaceutical at each demand market. We denote the demand price of firm i 's product at demand market R_k by ρ_{ik} and assume that

$$\rho_{ik} = \rho_{ik}(d), \quad i = 1, \dots, I; k = 1, \dots, n_R. \quad (9)$$

The Total Cost Functions

The total operational cost on link a may, in general, depend upon the product flows on all the links, that is,

$$\hat{c}_a = \hat{c}_a(f), \quad \forall a \in L, \quad (10)$$

where f is the vector of all the link flows. The total cost on each link is assumed to be convex and continuously differentiable.

X_i denotes the vector of path flows associated with firm i ; $i = 1, \dots, I$, where $X_i \equiv \{\{x_p\} | p \in P^i\} \in R_+^{n_{Pi}}$, and $P^i \equiv \cup_{k=1, \dots, n_R} P_k^i$. In turn, n_{Pi} , denotes the number of paths from firm i to the demand markets. Thus, X is the vector of all the firm' strategies, that is, $X \equiv \{\{X_i\} | i = 1, \dots, I\}$.

The Profit Function

The profit function of firm i , denoted by U_i , is expressed as:

$$U_i = \sum_{k=1}^{n_R} \rho_{ik}(d) \sum_{p \in P_k^i} \mu_p x_p - \sum_{a \in L^i} \hat{c}_a(f) - \sum_{a \in L^i} \hat{z}_a(f_a). \quad (11)$$

In lieu of the conservation of flow expressions (7) and (8), and the functional expressions (3b), (9), and (10), we may define $\hat{U}_i(X) = U_i$ for all firms i ; $i = 1, \dots, I$, with the I -dimensional vector \hat{U} being the vector of the profits of all the firms:

$$\hat{U} = \hat{U}(X). \quad (12)$$

Supply Chain Generalized Network Cournot-Nash Equilibrium

In the Cournot-Nash oligopolistic market framework, each firm selects its product path flows in a noncooperative manner, seeking to maximize its own profit, until an equilibrium is achieved, according to the definition below.

Definition 1: Supply Chain Generalized Network Cournot-Nash Equilibrium

A path flow pattern $X^ \in K = \prod_{i=1}^l K_i$ constitutes a supply chain generalized network Cournot-Nash equilibrium if for each firm i ; $i = 1, \dots, l$:*

$$\hat{U}_i(X_i^*, \hat{X}_i^*) \geq \hat{U}_i(X_i, \hat{X}_i^*), \quad \forall X_i \in K_i, \quad (13)$$

where $\hat{X}_i^ \equiv (X_1^*, \dots, X_{i-1}^*, X_{i+1}^*, \dots, X_l^*)$ and $K_i \equiv \{X_i | X_i \in R_+^{n_{Pi}}\}$.*

An equilibrium is established if no firm can unilaterally improve its profit by changing its production path flows, given the production path flow decisions of the other firms.

Next, we present the variational inequality formulations of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the pharmaceutical supply chain network under oligopolistic competition satisfying Definition 1, in terms of both path flows and link flows (see Cournot (1838), Nash (1950, 1951), Gabay and Moulin (1980), and Nagurney (2006)).

The Variational Inequality Formulation

Theorem 1

Assume that, for each pharmaceutical firm i ; $i = 1, \dots, I$, the profit function $\hat{U}_i(X)$ is concave with respect to the variables in X_i , and is continuously differentiable. Then $X^ \in K$ is a supply chain generalized network Cournot-Nash equilibrium according to Definition 1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:*

$$-\sum_{i=1}^I \langle \nabla_{X_i} \hat{U}_i(X^*)^T, X_i - X_i^* \rangle \geq 0, \quad \forall X \in K, \quad (14)$$

where $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$ denotes the inner product in the corresponding Euclidean space and $\nabla_{X_i} \hat{U}_i(X)$ denotes the gradient of $\hat{U}_i(X)$ with respect to X_i .

The Variational Inequality Formulation

Variational inequality (14), in turn, for our model, is equivalent to the variational inequality: determine $x^* \in K^1$ such that:

$$\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{k=1}^{n_R} \sum_{p \in P_k^i} \left[\frac{\partial \hat{C}_p(x^*)}{\partial x_p} + \frac{\partial \hat{Z}_p(x^*)}{\partial x_p} - \rho_{ik}(x^*) \mu_p - \sum_{l=1}^{n_R} \frac{\partial \rho_{il}(x^*)}{\partial d_{ik}} \mu_p \sum_{p \in P_l^i} \mu_p x_p^* \right] \times [x_p - x_p^*] \geq 0, \quad \forall x \in K^1, \quad (15)$$

where $K^1 \equiv \{x | x \in R_+^{np}\}$, and, for notational convenience, we denote:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{C}_p(x)}{\partial x_p} \equiv \sum_{b \in L^i} \sum_{a \in L^i} \frac{\partial \hat{c}_b(f)}{\partial f_a} \alpha_{ap} \text{ and } \frac{\partial \hat{Z}_p(x)}{\partial x_p} \equiv \sum_{a \in L^i} \frac{\partial \hat{z}_a(f_a)}{\partial f_a} \alpha_{ap}. \quad (16)$$

The Variational Inequality Formulation

Variational inequality (15) can also be re-expressed in terms of link flows as: determine the vector of equilibrium link flows and the vector of equilibrium demands $(f^, d^*) \in K^2$, such that:*

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{a \in L^i} \left[\sum_{b \in L^i} \frac{\partial \hat{c}_b(f^*)}{\partial f_a} + \frac{\partial \hat{z}_a(f_a^*)}{\partial f_a} \right] \times [f_a - f_a^*] \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{k=1}^{n_R} \left[-\rho_{ik}(d^*) - \sum_{l=1}^{n_R} \frac{\partial \rho_{il}(d^*)}{\partial d_{ik}} d_{il}^* \right] \times [d_{ik} - d_{ik}^*] \geq 0, \quad \forall (f, d) \in K^2, \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

where $K^2 \equiv \{(f, d) | x \geq 0, \text{ and (7), and (8) hold}\}$.

The Variational Inequality Formulation

Variational inequalities (15) and (17) can be put into standard form (see Nagurney (1999)): determine $X^* \in \mathcal{K}$ such that:

$$\langle F(X^*)^T, X - X^* \rangle \geq 0, \quad \forall X \in \mathcal{K}, \quad (18)$$

where $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$ denotes the inner product in n -dimensional Euclidean space. Let: $X \equiv x$ and

$$F(X) \equiv \left[\frac{\partial \hat{C}_p(x)}{\partial x_p} + \frac{\partial \hat{Z}_p(x)}{\partial x_p} - \rho_{ik}(x) \mu_p - \sum_{l=1}^{n_R} \frac{\partial \rho_{il}(x)}{\partial d_{ik}} \mu_p \sum_{p \in P_l^i} \mu_p x_p; \quad p \in P_k^i \right]$$

and $\mathcal{K} \equiv K^1$.

The Variational Inequality Formulation

Similarly, for the variational inequality in terms of link flows, if we define the column vectors: $X \equiv (f, d)$ and $F(X) \equiv (F_1(X), F_2(X))$:

$$F_1(X) = \left[\sum_{b \in L^i} \frac{\partial \hat{c}_b(f)}{\partial f_a} + \frac{\partial \hat{z}_a(f_a)}{\partial f_a}; a \in L^i; i = 1, \dots, I \right],$$

$$F_2(X) = \left[-\rho_{ik}(d) - \sum_{l=1}^{n_R} \frac{\partial \rho_{il}(d)}{\partial d_{lk}} d_{il}; i = 1, \dots, I; k = 1, \dots, n_R \right],$$

and let $\mathcal{K} \equiv K^2$.

Relationship of the Model to Others in the Literature

Relationship of the Model to Others in the Literature

The above model is now related to several models in the literature.

If the arc multipliers are all equal to 1, in which case the product is not perishable, then the model is related to the sustainable fashion supply chain network model of Nagurney and Yu (2011). In that model, however, the other criterion, in addition to the profit maximization one, was emission minimization, rather than waste cost minimization, as in the model in this paper.



Relationship of the Model to Others in the Literature

If the demands are fixed, and there is a single organization, but there are additional processing tiers, as well as capacity investments as variables, the model is the medical nuclear supply chain design model of Nagurney and Nagurney (2011).






Figure: The Medical Nuclear Supply Chain Network Topology

Relationship of the Model to Others in the Literature

If there is only a single organization / firm, and the demands are subject to uncertainty, with the inclusion of expected costs due to shortages or excess supplies, the total operational cost functions are separable, and a criterion of risk is added, then the model above is related to the blood supply chain network operations management model of Nagurney, Masoumi, and Yu (2011).






Figure: Supply Chain Network Topology for a Regionalized Blood Bank

Relationship of the Model to Others in the Literature

If the product is homogeneous, and all the arc multipliers are, again, assumed to be equal to 1, and the total costs are assumed to be separable, then the above model collapses to the supply chain network oligopoly model of Nagurney (2010) in which synergies associated with mergers and acquisitions were assessed.



The Original Supply Chain Network Oligopoly Model




Figure: Supply Chain Network Structure of the Oligopoly Without Perishability; Nagurney *Computational Management Science*, 2010, **7**, 377-401.

Mergers Through Coalition Formation




Figure: Mergers of the First $n_{1'}$ Firms and the Next $n_{2'}$ Firms

A Simple Perishable Product Numerical Example

A Simple Perishable Product Numerical Example

Pharmaceutical Firm 1

Pharmaceutical Firm 2




Figure: Supply Chain Network Topology for the Pharmaceutical Duopoly in the Illustrative Example

A Simple Perishable Product Numerical Example

In this example, two pharmaceutical firms compete in a duopoly with a single demand market (See Figure). The two firms produce differentiated, but substitutable, brand drugs 1 and 2, corresponding to Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively.

The total cost functions on the various links of manufacturing, shipment, storage, and distribution are:

$$\hat{c}_1(f_1) = 5f_1^2 + 8f_1, \hat{c}_2(f_2) = 7f_2^2 + 3f_2, \hat{c}_3(f_3) = 2f_3^2 + f_3,$$

$$\hat{c}_4(f_4) = 2f_4^2 + 2f_4,$$

$$\hat{c}_5(f_5) = 3f_5^2 + 4f_5, \hat{c}_6(f_6) = 3.5f_6^2 + f_6, \hat{c}_7(f_7) = 2f_7^2 + 5f_7,$$

$$\hat{c}_8(f_8) = 1.5f_8^2 + 4f_8.$$

The arc multipliers are given by:

$$\alpha_1 = .95, \alpha_2 = .98, \alpha_3 = .99, \alpha_4 = 1.00, \alpha_5 = .99, \alpha_6 = .97,$$

$$\alpha_7 = 1.00, \alpha_8 = 1.00.$$

A Simple Perishable Product Numerical Example

The total discarding cost functions on the links are assumed identical, that is,

$$\hat{z}_a(f_a) = .5f_a^2, \quad \forall a.$$

The firms compete in the demand market R_1 , and the consumers reveal their preferences for the two products through the following nonseparable demand price functions:

$$\rho_{11}(d) = -3d_{11} - d_{21} + 200, \quad \rho_{21}(d) = -4d_{21} - 1.5d_{11} + 300.$$

In this supply chain network, there exists one path corresponding to each firm, denoted by p_1 and p_2 .

A Simple Perishable Product Numerical Example

Thus, variational inequality (15), here takes the form:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[\frac{\partial \hat{C}_{p_1}(x^*)}{\partial x_{p_1}} + \frac{\partial \hat{Z}_{p_1}(x^*)}{\partial x_{p_1}} - \rho_{11}(x^*)\mu_{p_1} - \frac{\partial \rho_{11}(x^*)}{\partial d_{11}}\mu_{p_1} \times \mu_{p_1}x_{p_1}^* \right] \\ & \quad \times [x_{p_1} - x_{p_1}^*] \\ & + \left[\frac{\partial \hat{C}_{p_2}(x^*)}{\partial x_{p_2}} + \frac{\partial \hat{Z}_{p_2}(x^*)}{\partial x_{p_2}} - \rho_{21}(x^*)\mu_{p_2} - \frac{\partial \rho_{21}(x^*)}{\partial d_{21}}\mu_{p_2} \times \mu_{p_2}x_{p_2}^* \right] \\ & \quad \times [x_{p_2} - x_{p_2}^*] \geq 0, \forall x \in K^1. \end{aligned}$$

A Simple Perishable Product Numerical Example

Under the assumption that $x_{p_1}^* > 0$ and $x_{p_2}^* > 0$, the two expressions on the left-hand side of inequality (27) must be equal to zero, that is:

$$\left[\frac{\partial \hat{C}_{p_1}(x^*)}{\partial x_{p_1}} + \frac{\partial \hat{Z}_{p_1}(x^*)}{\partial x_{p_1}} - \rho_{11}(x^*)\mu_{p_1} - \frac{\partial \rho_{11}(x^*)}{\partial d_{11}}\mu_{p_1} \times \mu_{p_1}x_{p_1}^* \right] \\ \times [x_{p_1} - x_{p_1}^*] = 0,$$

and

$$\left[\frac{\partial \hat{C}_{p_2}(x^*)}{\partial x_{p_2}} + \frac{\partial \hat{Z}_{p_2}(x^*)}{\partial x_{p_2}} - \rho_{21}(x^*)\mu_{p_2} - \frac{\partial \rho_{21}(x^*)}{\partial d_{21}}\mu_{p_2} \times \mu_{p_2}x_{p_2}^* \right] \\ \times [x_{p_2} - x_{p_2}^*] = 0.$$

Since each of the paths flows must be nonnegative, we know that the term preceding the multiplication sign in both of the above must be equal to zero.

A Simple Perishable Product Numerical Example

Calculating the values of the multipliers from (6), and then, substituting those values, as well as, the given functions into (16), we can determine the partial derivatives of the total operational cost and the total discarding cost functions. Furthermore, the partial derivatives of the given demand price functions can be calculated and substituted into the above. Applying (5), the path multipliers are equal to:

$$\mu_{p_1} = \alpha_1 \times \alpha_3 \times \alpha_5 \times \alpha_7 = .95 \times .99 \times .99 \times 1 = .93,$$

$$\mu_{p_2} = \alpha_2 \times \alpha_4 \times \alpha_6 \times \alpha_8 = .98 \times 1 \times .97 \times 1 = .95.$$

Simple arithmetic calculations, with the above substitutions, yield the below system of equations:

$$\begin{cases} 31.24x_{p_1}^* + 0.89x_{p_2}^* = 168.85, \\ 1.33x_{p_1}^* + 38.33x_{p_2}^* = 274.46. \end{cases}$$

A Simple Perishable Product Numerical Example

Thus, the equilibrium solution corresponding to the path flow of brand drugs produced by firms 1 and 2 is:

$$x_{p1}^* = 5.21, \quad x_{p2}^* = 6.98.$$

Using (7), the equilibrium link flows can be calculated as:

$$f_1^* = 5.21, \quad f_3^* = 4.95, \quad f_5^* = 4.90, \quad f_7^* = 4.85,$$

$$f_2^* = 6.98, \quad f_4^* = 6.84, \quad f_6^* = 6.84, \quad f_8^* = 6.64.$$

From (8), the equilibrium values of demand for products of the two pharmaceutical firms are equal to:

$$d_{11}^* = 4.85, \quad d_{21}^* = 6.64.$$

Finally, the equilibrium prices of the two branded drugs are:

$$\rho_{11} = 178.82, \quad \rho_{21} = 266.19.$$

Note that, even though the price of Firm 2's product is observed to be higher, the market has a slightly stronger tendency toward this product as opposed to the product of Firm 1.

This is due to the willingness of the consumers to spend more on one product which can be a consequence of the reputation, or the perceived quality, of Firm 2's brand drug.

The Algorithm with Explicit Formulae

The Algorithm

We now recall the Euler method, which is induced by the general iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993). Its realization for the solution of the supply chain generalized network oligopoly model with brand differentiation governed by variational inequality (15) induces subproblems that can be solved explicitly and in closed form.

Specifically, iteration τ of the Euler method (see also Nagurney and Zhang (1996)) is given by:

$$X^{\tau+1} = P_{\mathcal{K}}(X^{\tau} - a_{\tau}F(X^{\tau})),$$

where $P_{\mathcal{K}}$ is the projection on the feasible set \mathcal{K} and F is the function that enters the variational inequality problem (18).

The Algorithm

As shown in Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and Nagurney and Zhang (1996), for convergence of the general iterative scheme, which induces the Euler method, the sequence $\{a_\tau\}$ must satisfy:

$$\sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} a_\tau = \infty, a_\tau > 0, a_\tau \rightarrow 0, \text{ as } \tau \rightarrow \infty.$$

Conditions for convergence of this scheme as well as various applications to the solutions of network oligopolies can be found in Nagurney and Zhang (1996), Nagurney, Dupuis, and Zhang (1994), Nagurney (2010a), and Nagurney and Yu (2011).

The Algorithm

Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the Supply Chain Generalized Network Oligopoly Variational Inequality (15)

The elegance of this procedure for the computation of solutions to our supply chain generalized network oligopoly model with product differentiation can be seen in the following explicit formulae. In particular, we have the following closed form expressions for all the path flows $p \in P_k^i, \forall i, k$:

$$x_p^{\tau+1} = \max \left\{ 0, x_p^{\tau} + a_{\tau}(\rho_{ik}(x^{\tau}))\mu_p + \sum_{l=1}^{n_R} \frac{\partial \rho_{il}(x^{\tau})}{\partial d_{ik}} \mu_p \sum_{p \in P_l^i} \mu_p x_p^{\tau} - \frac{\partial \hat{C}_p(x^{\tau})}{\partial x_p} - \frac{\partial \hat{Z}_p(x^{\tau})}{\partial x_p} \right\}.$$

A Case Study

A Case Study – Case I

Firm 1 represents a multinational pharmaceutical giant, hypothetically, Pfizer, Inc., which currently possesses the patent for Lipitor, the most popular brand of cholesterol-lowering drug. With more than \$5 billion of sales in the US alone in 2011, this drug was once the top-selling pharmaceutical brand in the world (Rossi (2011)).

Firm 2, on the other hand, which might represent, for example, Merck & Co., Inc., also is one of the largest global pharmaceutical companies, and has been producing Zocor, another cholesterol regulating brand, whose patent expired in 2006.

We consider two competing brands in three demand markets located across the US. Each of the two firms is assumed to have two manufacturing units and three storage / distribution centers, as illustrated in the Figure.

The Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Network Topology for Case I

Pharmaceutical Firm 1

Pharmaceutical Firm 2




Figure: Case I Supply Chain Network

A Case Study – Case I

The demand price functions corresponding to the three demand markets for each of the two brands 1 and 2 were as follows:

$$\rho_{11}(d) = -1.1d_{11} - 0.9d_{21} + 275; \quad \rho_{21}(d) = -1.2d_{21} - 0.7d_{11} + 210;$$

$$\rho_{12}(d) = -0.9d_{12} - 0.8d_{22} + 255; \quad \rho_{22}(d) = -1.0d_{22} - 0.5d_{12} + 200;$$

$$\rho_{13}(d) = -1.4d_{13} - 1.0d_{23} + 265; \quad \rho_{23}(d) = -1.5d_{23} - 0.4d_{13} + 186.$$

The Euler method for the solution of variational inequality (15) was implemented in Matlab on a Microsoft Windows 7 System with a Dell PC at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. We set the sequence $a_\tau = .1(1, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \dots)$, and the convergence tolerance was 10^{-6} . In other words, the absolute value of the difference between each path flow in two consecutive iterations was less than or equal to this tolerance.

A Case Study – Case I

The arc multipliers, the total operational cost functions, and the total discarding cost functions were as reported in the next Table. These cost functions have been selected based on the average values of the data corresponding to the prices, the shipping costs, etc., available on the web. The values of arc multipliers, in turn, although hypothetical, are constructed in order to reflect the percentage of perishability / waste / loss associated with the various supply chain network activities in medical drug supply chains.

The equilibrium pattern is also reported in the Table.

Link Multipliers, Total Cost Functions and Link Flow Solution for Case I

Link a	α_a	$\hat{c}_a(f_a)$	$\hat{z}_a(f_a)$	f_a^*
1	.95	$5f_1^2 + 8f_1$	$.5f_1^2$	13.73
2	.97	$7f_2^2 + 3f_2$	$.4f_2^2$	10.77
3	.96	$6.5f_3^2 + 4f_3$	$.3f_3^2$	8.42
4	.98	$5f_4^2 + 7f_4$	$.35f_4^2$	10.55
5	1.00	$.7f_5^2 + f_5$	$.5f_5^2$	5.21
6	.99	$.9f_6^2 + 2f_6$	$.5f_6^2$	3.36
7	1.00	$.5f_7^2 + f_7$	$.5f_7^2$	4.47
8	.99	$f_8^2 + 2f_8$	$.6f_8^2$	3.02
9	1.00	$.7f_9^2 + 3f_9$	$.6f_9^2$	3.92
10	1.00	$.6f_{10}^2 + 1.5f_{10}$	$.6f_{10}^2$	3.50
11	.99	$.8f_{11}^2 + 2f_{11}$	$.4f_{11}^2$	3.10
12	.99	$.8f_{12}^2 + 5f_{12}$	$.4f_{12}^2$	2.36
13	.98	$.9f_{13}^2 + 4f_{13}$	$.4f_{13}^2$	2.63
14	1.00	$.8f_{14}^2 + 2f_{14}$	$.5f_{14}^2$	3.79
15	.99	$.9f_{15}^2 + 3f_{15}$	$.5f_{15}^2$	3.12
16	1.00	$1.1f_{16}^2 + 3f_{16}$	$.6f_{16}^2$	3.43
17	.98	$2f_{17}^2 + 3f_{17}$	$.45f_{17}^2$	8.20
18	.99	$2.5f_{18}^2 + f_{18}$	$.55f_{18}^2$	7.25
19	.98	$2.4f_{19}^2 + 1.5f_{19}$	$.5f_{19}^2$	7.97
20	.98	$1.8f_{20}^2 + 3f_{20}$	$.3f_{20}^2$	6.85

Link Multipliers, Total Cost Functions and Solution for Case I (cont'd)

Link a	α_a	$\hat{c}_a(f_a)$	$\hat{z}_a(f_a)$	f_a^*
21	.98	$2.1f_{21}^2 + 3f_{21}$	$.35f_{21}^2$	5.42
22	.99	$1.9f_{22}^2 + 2.5f_{22}$	$.5f_{22}^2$	6.00
23	1.00	$.5f_{23}^2 + 2f_{23}$	$.6f_{23}^2$	3.56
24	1.00	$.7f_{24}^2 + f_{24}$	$.6f_{24}^2$	1.66
25	.99	$.5f_{25}^2 + .8f_{25}$	$.6f_{25}^2$	2.82
26	.99	$.6f_{26}^2 + f_{26}$	$.45f_{26}^2$	3.34
27	.99	$.7f_{27}^2 + .8f_{27}$	$.4f_{27}^2$	1.24
28	.98	$.4f_{28}^2 + .8f_{28}$	$.45f_{28}^2$	2.59
29	1.00	$.3f_{29}^2 + 3f_{29}$	$.55f_{29}^2$	3.45
30	1.00	$.75f_{30}^2 + f_{30}$	$.55f_{30}^2$	1.28
31	1.00	$.65f_{31}^2 + f_{31}$	$.55f_{31}^2$	3.09
32	.99	$.5f_{32}^2 + 2f_{32}$	$.3f_{32}^2$	2.54
33	.99	$.4f_{33}^2 + 3f_{33}$	$.3f_{33}^2$	3.43
34	1.00	$.5f_{34}^2 + 3.5f_{34}$	$.4f_{34}^2$	0.75
35	.98	$.4f_{35}^2 + 2f_{35}$	$.55f_{35}^2$	1.72
36	.98	$.3f_{36}^2 + 2.5f_{36}$	$.55f_{36}^2$	2.64
37	.99	$.55f_{37}^2 + 2f_{37}$	$.55f_{37}^2$	0.95
38	1.00	$.35f_{38}^2 + 2f_{38}$	$.4f_{38}^2$	3.47
39	1.00	$.4f_{39}^2 + 5f_{39}$	$.4f_{39}^2$	2.47
40	.98	$.55f_{40}^2 + 2f_{40}$	$.6f_{40}^2$	0.00

A Case Study – Case I

The values of the equilibrium link flows in the Table demonstrate the impact of perishability of the product throughout the supply chain network links of each pharmaceutical firm. Under the above demand price functions, the computed equilibrium demands for each of the two brands were:

$$d_{11}^* = 10.32, d_{21}^* = 7.66, d_{12}^* = 4.17, d_{22}^* = 8.46, d_{13}^* = 8.41, \\ d_{23}^* = 1.69.$$

Furthermore, the incurred equilibrium prices associated with the branded drugs at each demand market were as follows:

$$\rho_{11} = 256.75, \rho_{21} = 193.58, \rho_{12} = 244.48, \rho_{22} = 189.46, \rho_{13} = 251.52, \\ \rho_{23} = 180.09.$$

A Case Study – Case I

Firm 1, which produces the top-selling product, captures the majority of the market share at demand markets 1 and 3, despite the higher price. While this firm has a slight advantage over its competitor in demand market 1, it has almost entirely seized demand market 3. Consequently, several links connecting Firm 2 to demand market 3 have insignificant flows including link 40 with a flow equal to zero.

In contrast, Firm 2 dominates demand market 2, due to the consumers' willingness to lean towards this product there, perhaps as a consequence of the lower price, or the perception of quality, etc., as compared to the product of Firm 1.

The profits of the two firms are:

$$U_1 = 2,936.52 \text{ and } U_2 = 1,675.89.$$

Recall that Firm 1 still holds the patent rights of its branded drug, and, thus, makes a higher profit from selling cholesterol regulators.


In contrast, Firm 2 has completed the competition-free timespan for its brand of cholesterol medicine a few years ago as a consequence of losing the patent rights to the manufacturers of generic drugs. Hence, fewer numbers of consumers choose this product as compared to the product of Firm 1 leading to a higher profit for the producer of the newer brand.

A Case Study – Case II

In this case, we consider the scenario in which Firm 1 has just lost the exclusive patent right of its highly popular cholesterol regulator. A manufacturer of generic drugs, say, Sanofi, here denoted by Firm 3, has recently introduced a generic substitute for Lipitor by reproducing its active ingredient Atorvastatin (Smith (2011)). Firm 3 is assumed to have two manufacturing plants, two distribution centers as well as two storage facilities in order to supply the same three demand markets as in Case I (See Figure).

The Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Network Topology for Cases II and III

Pharmaceutical Firm 1 Pharmaceutical Firm 3 Pharmaceutical Firm 2



A Case Study – Case II

Since, in Case II, the new generic drug has just been released, we assume that the demand price functions for the products of Firm 1 and 2 will stay the same as in Case I. On the other hand, the demand price functions corresponding to the product of Firm 3 for demand markets 1, 2, and 3 are as follows:

$$\rho_{31}(d) = -0.9d_{31} - 0.6d_{11} - 0.8d_{21} + 150;$$

$$\rho_{32}(d) = -0.8d_{32} - 0.5d_{12} - 0.6d_{22} + 130;$$

$$\rho_{33}(d) = -0.9d_{33} - 0.7d_{13} - 0.5d_{23} + 133.$$

The next Table displays the arc multipliers, the total operational and the total discarding cost functions with regards to the existing links as well as the new links. The computed values of the equilibrium link flows are also reported in the next Table.

Link Multipliers, Total Cost Functions and Link Flow Solution for Case II

Link a	α_a	$\hat{c}_a(f_a)$	$\hat{z}_a(f_a)$	f_a^*
1	.95	$5f_1^2 + 8f_1$	$.5f_1^2$	13.73
2	.97	$7f_2^2 + 3f_2$	$.4f_2^2$	10.77
3	.96	$6.5f_3^2 + 4f_3$	$.3f_3^2$	8.42
4	.98	$5f_4^2 + 7f_4$	$.35f_4^2$	10.55
5	1.00	$.7f_5^2 + f_5$	$.5f_5^2$	5.21
6	.99	$.9f_6^2 + 2f_6$	$.5f_6^2$	3.36
7	1.00	$.5f_7^2 + f_7$	$.5f_7^2$	4.47
8	.99	$f_8^2 + 2f_8$	$.6f_8^2$	3.02
9	1.00	$.7f_9^2 + 3f_9$	$.6f_9^2$	3.92
10	1.00	$.6f_{10}^2 + 1.5f_{10}$	$.6f_{10}^2$	3.50
11	.99	$.8f_{11}^2 + 2f_{11}$	$.4f_{11}^2$	3.10
12	.99	$.8f_{12}^2 + 5f_{12}$	$.4f_{12}^2$	2.36
13	.98	$.9f_{13}^2 + 4f_{13}$	$.4f_{13}^2$	2.63
14	1.00	$.8f_{14}^2 + 2f_{14}$	$.5f_{14}^2$	3.79
15	.99	$.9f_{15}^2 + 3f_{15}$	$.5f_{15}^2$	3.12
16	1.00	$1.1f_{16}^2 + 3f_{16}$	$.6f_{16}^2$	3.43
17	.98	$2f_{17}^2 + 3f_{17}$	$.45f_{17}^2$	8.20
18	.99	$2.5f_{18}^2 + f_{18}$	$.55f_{18}^2$	7.25
19	.98	$2.4f_{19}^2 + 1.5f_{19}$	$.5f_{19}^2$	7.97
20	.98	$1.8f_{20}^2 + 3f_{20}$	$.3f_{20}^2$	6.85
21	.98	$2.1f_{21}^2 + 3f_{21}$	$.35f_{21}^2$	5.42
22	.99	$1.9f_{22}^2 + 2.5f_{22}$	$.5f_{22}^2$	6.00
23	1.00	$.5f_{23}^2 + 2f_{23}$	$.6f_{23}^2$	3.56
24	1.00	$.7f_{24}^2 + f_{24}$	$.6f_{24}^2$	1.66
25	.99	$.5f_{25}^2 + .8f_{25}$	$.6f_{25}^2$	2.82
26	.99	$.6f_{26}^2 + f_{26}$	$.45f_{26}^2$	3.34
27	.99	$.7f_{27}^2 + .8f_{27}$	$.4f_{27}^2$	1.24

Link Multipliers, Total Cost Functions and Solution for Case II (cont'd)

Link a	α_a	$\hat{c}_a(f_a)$	$\hat{z}_a(f_a)$	f_a^*
28	.98	$.4f_{28}^2 + .8f_{28}$	$.45f_{28}^2$	2.59
29	1.00	$.3f_{29}^2 + 3f_{29}$	$.55f_{29}^2$	3.45
30	1.00	$.75f_{30}^2 + f_{30}$	$.55f_{30}^2$	1.28
31	1.00	$.65f_{31}^2 + f_{31}$	$.55f_{31}^2$	3.09
32	.99	$.5f_{32}^2 + 2f_{32}$	$.3f_{32}^2$	2.54
33	.99	$.4f_{33}^2 + 3f_{33}$	$.3f_{33}^2$	3.43
34	1.00	$.5f_{34}^2 + 3.5f_{34}$	$.4f_{34}^2$	0.75
35	.98	$.4f_{35}^2 + 2f_{35}$	$.55f_{35}^2$	1.72
36	.98	$.3f_{36}^2 + 2.5f_{36}$	$.55f_{36}^2$	2.64
37	.99	$.55f_{37}^2 + 2f_{37}$	$.55f_{37}^2$	0.95
38	1.00	$.35f_{38}^2 + 2f_{38}$	$.4f_{38}^2$	3.47
39	1.00	$.4f_{39}^2 + 5f_{39}$	$.4f_{39}^2$	2.47
40	.98	$.55f_{40}^2 + 2f_{40}$	$.6f_{40}^2$	0.00
41	.97	$3f_{41}^2 + 12f_{41}$	$.3f_{41}^2$	6.17
42	.96	$2.7f_{42}^2 + 10f_{42}$	$.4f_{42}^2$	6.23
43	.98	$1.1f_{43}^2 + 6f_{43}$	$.45f_{43}^2$	3.23
44	.98	$.9f_{44}^2 + 5f_{44}$	$.45f_{44}^2$	2.75
45	.97	$1.3f_{45}^2 + 6f_{45}$	$.5f_{45}^2$	3.60
46	.99	$1.5f_{46}^2 + 7f_{46}$	$.55f_{46}^2$	2.38
47	.98	$1.5f_{47}^2 + 4f_{47}$	$.4f_{47}^2$	6.66
48	.98	$2.1f_{48}^2 + 6f_{48}$	$.45f_{48}^2$	5.05
49	.99	$.6f_{49}^2 + 3f_{49}$	$.55f_{49}^2$	3.79
50	1.00	$.7f_{50}^2 + 2f_{50}$	$.7f_{50}^2$	1.94
51	.98	$.6f_{51}^2 + 7f_{51}$	$.45f_{51}^2$	0.79
52	.99	$.9f_{52}^2 + 9f_{52}$	$.5f_{52}^2$	1.43
53	1.00	$.55f_{53}^2 + 6f_{53}$	$.55f_{53}^2$	1.23
54	.98	$.8f_{54}^2 + 4f_{54}$	$.5f_{54}^2$	2.28

A Case Study – Case II

The equilibrium product flows of Firms 1 and 2 on links 1 through 40 are identical to the corresponding values in Case I.

When the new product produced by Firm 3 is just introduced, the manufacturers of the two existing products will not experience an immediate impact on their respective demands of branded drugs.

Consequently, the equilibrium computed demands for the products of Firms 1 and 2 at the demand markets will remain as in Case I.

However, the equilibrium amounts of demand for the new product of Firm 3 at each demand market is equal to:

$$d_{31}^* = 5.17, \quad d_{32}^* = 3.18, \quad \text{and} \quad d_{33}^* = 3.01.$$

A Case Study – Case III

Under the above assumptions, the equilibrium prices associated with the branded drugs 1 and 2 at the demand markets will not change, whereas the incurred equilibrium prices of generic drug 3 are as follows:

$$\rho_{31} = 133.02, \quad \rho_{32} = 120.30, \quad \text{and} \quad \rho_{33} = 123.55,$$

which is significantly lower than the respective prices of its competitors in all the demand markets.

Thus, the profit that Firm 3 derived from manufacturing and delivering the new generic substitute to these 3 markets is:

$$U_3 = 637.38,$$

while the profits of Firms 1 and 2 remain unchanged. In the next case, we will investigate the situation in which the consumers are now more aware of the new generic substitute of cholesterol regulators.

A Case Study – Case III

We assumed that the generic product of Firm 3 has now been well-established, and has affected the behavior of the consumers through the demand price functions of the relatively more recognized products of Firms 1 and 2. The demand price functions associated are now given by:

$$\text{Firm 1: } \rho_{11}(d) = -1.1d_{11} - 0.9d_{21} - 1.0d_{31} + 192;$$

$$\rho_{21}(d) = -1.2d_{21} - 0.7d_{11} - 0.8d_{31} + 176;$$

$$\rho_{31} = -0.9d_{31} - 0.6d_{11} - 0.8d_{21} + 170;$$

$$\text{Firm 2: } \rho_{12}(d) = -0.9d_{12} - 0.8d_{22} - 0.7d_{32} + 166;$$

$$\rho_{22}(d) = -1.0d_{22} - 0.5d_{12} - 0.8d_{32} + 146;$$

$$\rho_{32}(d) = -0.8d_{32} - 0.5d_{12} - 0.6d_{22} + 153;$$

$$\text{Firm 3: } \rho_{13}(d) = -1.4d_{13} - 1.0d_{23} - 0.5d_{33} + 173;$$

$$\rho_{23}(d) = -1.5d_{23} - 0.4d_{13} - 0.7d_{33} + 164;$$

$$\rho_{33}(d) = -0.9d_{33} - 0.7d_{13} - 0.5d_{23} + 157.$$

A Case Study – Case III

The arc multipliers, the total operational and the total discarding cost functions are the same as in Case II, as reported in the next Table. The new computed equilibrium link flows are also reported there.

Link Multipliers, Total Cost Functions and Link Flow Solution for Case III

Link a	α_a	$\hat{c}_a(f_a)$	$\hat{z}_a(f_a)$	f_a^*
1	.95	$5f_1^2 + 8f_1$	$.5f_1^2$	8.42
2	.97	$7f_2^2 + 3f_2$	$.4f_2^2$	6.72
3	.96	$6.5f_3^2 + 4f_3$	$.3f_3^2$	6.42
4	.98	$5f_4^2 + 7f_4$	$.35f_4^2$	8.01
5	1.00	$.7f_5^2 + f_5$	$.5f_5^2$	3.20
6	.99	$.9f_6^2 + 2f_6$	$.5f_6^2$	2.07
7	1.00	$.5f_7^2 + f_7$	$.5f_7^2$	2.73
8	.99	$f_8^2 + 2f_8$	$.6f_8^2$	1.85
9	1.00	$.7f_9^2 + 3f_9$	$.6f_9^2$	2.44
10	1.00	$.6f_{10}^2 + 1.5f_{10}$	$.6f_{10}^2$	2.23
11	.99	$.8f_{11}^2 + 2f_{11}$	$.4f_{11}^2$	2.42
12	.99	$.8f_{12}^2 + 5f_{12}$	$.4f_{12}^2$	1.75
13	.98	$.9f_{13}^2 + 4f_{13}$	$.4f_{13}^2$	2.00
14	1.00	$.8f_{14}^2 + 2f_{14}$	$.5f_{14}^2$	2.84
15	.99	$.9f_{15}^2 + 3f_{15}$	$.5f_{15}^2$	2.40
16	1.00	$1.1f_{16}^2 + 3f_{16}$	$.6f_{16}^2$	2.60
17	.98	$2f_{17}^2 + 3f_{17}$	$.45f_{17}^2$	5.02
18	.99	$2.5f_{18}^2 + f_{18}$	$.55f_{18}^2$	4.49
19	.98	$2.4f_{19}^2 + 1.5f_{19}$	$.5f_{19}^2$	4.96
20	.98	$1.8f_{20}^2 + 3f_{20}$	$.3f_{20}^2$	5.23
21	.98	$2.1f_{21}^2 + 3f_{21}$	$.35f_{21}^2$	4.11
22	.99	$1.9f_{22}^2 + 2.5f_{22}$	$.5f_{22}^2$	4.56
23	1.00	$.5f_{23}^2 + 2f_{23}$	$.6f_{23}^2$	2.44
24	1.00	$.7f_{24}^2 + f_{24}$	$.6f_{24}^2$	1.47
25	.99	$.5f_{25}^2 + .8f_{25}$	$.6f_{25}^2$	1.02
26	.99	$.6f_{26}^2 + f_{26}$	$.45f_{26}^2$	2.48
27	.99	$.7f_{27}^2 + .8f_{27}$	$.4f_{27}^2$	1.31

Link Multipliers, Total Cost Functions and Solution for Case III (cont'd)

Link a	α_a	$\hat{c}_a(f_a)$	$\hat{z}_a(f_a)$	f_a^*
28	.98	$.4f_{28}^2 + .8f_{28}$	$.45f_{28}^2$	0.66
29	1.00	$.3f_{29}^2 + 3f_{29}$	$.55f_{29}^2$	2.29
30	1.00	$.75f_{30}^2 + f_{30}$	$.55f_{30}^2$	1.29
31	1.00	$.65f_{31}^2 + f_{31}$	$.55f_{31}^2$	1.28
32	.99	$.5f_{32}^2 + 2f_{32}$	$.3f_{32}^2$	2.74
33	.99	$.4f_{33}^2 + 3f_{33}$	$.3f_{33}^2$	0.00
34	1.00	$.5f_{34}^2 + 3.5f_{34}$	$.4f_{34}^2$	2.39
35	.98	$.4f_{35}^2 + 2f_{35}$	$.55f_{35}^2$	1.82
36	.98	$.3f_{36}^2 + 2.5f_{36}$	$.55f_{36}^2$	0.00
37	.99	$.55f_{37}^2 + 2f_{37}$	$.55f_{37}^2$	2.21
38	1.00	$.35f_{38}^2 + 2f_{38}$	$.4f_{38}^2$	3.46
39	1.00	$.4f_{39}^2 + 5f_{39}$	$.4f_{39}^2$	0.00
40	.98	$.55f_{40}^2 + 2f_{40}$	$.6f_{40}^2$	1.05
41	.97	$3f_{41}^2 + 12f_{41}$	$.3f_{41}^2$	8.08
42	.96	$2.7f_{42}^2 + 10f_{42}$	$.4f_{42}^2$	8.13
43	.98	$1.1f_{43}^2 + 6f_{43}$	$.45f_{43}^2$	4.21
44	.98	$.9f_{44}^2 + 5f_{44}$	$.45f_{44}^2$	3.63
45	.97	$1.3f_{45}^2 + 6f_{45}$	$.5f_{45}^2$	4.62
46	.99	$1.5f_{46}^2 + 7f_{46}$	$.55f_{46}^2$	3.19
47	.98	$1.5f_{47}^2 + 4f_{47}$	$.4f_{47}^2$	8.60
48	.98	$2.1f_{48}^2 + 6f_{48}$	$.45f_{48}^2$	6.72
49	.99	$.6f_{49}^2 + 3f_{49}$	$.55f_{49}^2$	3.63
50	1.00	$.7f_{50}^2 + 2f_{50}$	$.7f_{50}^2$	3.39
51	.98	$.6f_{51}^2 + 7f_{51}$	$.45f_{51}^2$	1.41
52	.99	$.9f_{52}^2 + 9f_{52}$	$.5f_{52}^2$	1.12
53	1.00	$.55f_{53}^2 + 6f_{53}$	$.55f_{53}^2$	2.86
54	.98	$.8f_{54}^2 + 4f_{54}$	$.5f_{54}^2$	2.60

A Case Study – Case III

The computed equilibrium demands for the products of Firms 1, 2, and 3 are as follows:

$$d_{11}^* = 7.18, \quad d_{12}^* = 4.06, \quad d_{13}^* = 2.93,$$

$$d_{21}^* = 7.96, \quad d_{22}^* = 0.00, \quad d_{23}^* = 5.60,$$

$$d_{31}^* = 4.70, \quad d_{32}^* = 6.25, \quad \text{and } d_{33}^* = 3.93.$$

As a result of the consumers' growing inclination towards the generic substitute of the previously popular Lipitor, the link flow and the demand pattern has now significantly changed. For example, Firm 2 has lost its entire share of market 2 to its competitors, resulting in zero flows on the corresponding distribution links: 33, 36, and 39. Similarly, Firm 1 now has declining sales of its brand in demand markets 1 and 3.




A Case Study – Case III

Furthermore, as expected, the introduction of the generic substitute of cholesterol regulators has also caused remarkable drops in the prices of the existing brands. Interestingly, the decrease in the price of Firm 1's product - Lipitor - in demand markets 2 and 3 exceeds 35%:

$$\begin{aligned}\rho_{11} &= 172.24, & \rho_{12} &= 157.97, & \rho_{13} &= 161.33, \\ \rho_{21} &= 157.66, & \rho_{22} &= 138.97, & \rho_{23} &= 151.67, \\ \rho_{31} &= 155.09, & \rho_{32} &= 145.97, & \text{and } \rho_{33} &= 148.61.\end{aligned}$$

Finally, the computed amounts of profit for each of the three competitors through the production and delivery of their respective cholesterol-lowering medicines are as follows:

$$U_1 = 1,199.87, \quad U_2 = 1,062.73, \quad \text{and } U_3 = 980.83.$$

Note that simultaneous declines in the amounts of demand and sales price has caused a severe reduction in the profits of Firms 1 and 2. This decline for Firm 1 is observed to be as high as 60%.   

Blood Supply Chains for the Red Cross

Blood Supply Chains for the Red Cross

A. Nagurney, A. Masoumi, and M. Yu, Supply chain network operations management of a blood banking system with cost and risk minimization, *Computational Management Science* **9(2)**, 2012, 205-231.



Blood Supply Chains for the Red Cross

- ▶ Over 39,000 donations are needed everyday in the United States, and the blood supply is frequently reported to be just 2 days away from running out (American Red Cross (2010)).
- ▶ Hospitals with as many days of surgical delays due to blood shortage as 120 a year have been observed (Whitaker et al. (2007)).
- ▶ The national estimate for the number of units blood products outdated by blood centers and hospitals was 1,276,000 out of 15,688,000 units (Whitaker et al. (2007)).

The American Red Cross is the major supplier of blood products to hospitals and medical centers satisfying over 45% of the demand for blood components nationally (Walker (2010)).



**American
Red Cross**

Together, we can save a life




Background and Motivation

The hospital cost of a unit of red blood cells in the US had a **6.4%** increase from 2005 to 2007.

In the US, this criticality has become more of an issue in the **Northeastern** and **Southwestern** states since this cost is meaningfully higher compared to that of the Southeastern and Central states.



Supply Chain Network Topology for a Regionalized Blood Bank



ARC Regional Division

Blood Collection Sites

Blood Centers

Component Labs

Storage Facilities

Distribution Centers

Demand Points

Blood Supply Chains for the Red Cross

We developed a supply chain network optimization model for the management of the procurement, testing and processing, and distribution of a perishable product – that of human blood.

Novel features of the model include:

- ▶ It captures **perishability of this life-saving product** through the use of arc multipliers;
- ▶ It contains **discarding costs** associated with waste/disposal;
- ▶ It handles **uncertainty** associated with demand points;
- ▶ It assesses **costs associated with shortages/surpluses at the demand points**, and
- ▶ It quantifies the **supply-side risk** associated with procurement.

Blood Supply Chains for the Red Cross

The model has also been extended to supply chain network design; see: Supply Chain Network Design of a Sustainable Blood Banking System, A. Nagurney and A. H. Masoumi, in *Sustainable Supply Chains: Models, Methods and Public Policy Implications*, T. Boone, V. Jayaraman, and R. Ganeshan, Editors, Springer, London, England, 2012, pp 49-72.

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